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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Ci

§ 78A-4-103(2)G).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Lyle Drake advised the former Trustee that she was not required to

put in the Trust an asset that had been transferred to her after she agreed to serve as
a Co-Trustee, and that otherwise would have gone into the Trust.

Drake also

advised the former Trustee that she did not have a conflict in asserting her right to
Ci

keep the asset out of the Trust. Did the trial court err in dismissing-on the basis
of res judicata-the independent Trustee's claims against Drake related to his
Gi)

advice regarding that asset?

"A district court's ruling on ... a motion to dismiss ... is a legal question
which we review for correctness." Commonwealth Property Advocates, LLC v.

Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc., 2011 UT App 232, 263 P.3d 397.
This issue was preserved in the trial court by the Trustee's response to Drake's
motion to dismiss (R. 77-183) and the trial court's order granting that motion in
part (R. 412-16).
1
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2.

Did the trial court eIT in granting summary judgment in favor of

attorney Lyle Drake and his firm with respect to the Trustee's claims of
professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duties relating to Drake's advice
that the former Trustee was not required to account for her full tenure as Trustee,
that the former Trustee did not have a conflict of interest, and that the former
Trustee could use Ttust assets to further her personal interests?
"An appellate court reviews a lower court's legal conclusions and ultimate
grant or denial of summary judgment for co1Tectness and views the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.'' Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39,
284 P.3d 630 (quoting Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2,

iJ 6,

iJ 9,

177 P.3d 600). Thus,

summary judgment is appropriate only "when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.
(citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This issue was preserved in the trial court by the
Trustee's response to Drake's motion for summary judgment (R. 993-2258) and
the trial court's decision granting that motion (R. 2737-39).
3.

Did the trial court eIT in granting summary judgment in favor of

attorney Daniel Maynard and his firm with respect to the Trustee's claims of
professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duties?

2
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"An appellate court reviews a lower court's legal conclusions and ultimate
grant or denial of summary judgment for coffectness and views the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party." Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39,
284 P.3d 630 (quoting Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2,

,r 9,

iJ 6, 177 P.3d 600). Thus,

summary judgment is appropriate only "when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.
(citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This issue was preserved in the trial court by the
Trustee's response to Maynard's motion for summary judgment (R. 3194-3574),
and the trial court's decision granting that motion (R. 3626-38).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND
RULES

Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-811 (set forth in Addendum).
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004(2) (set forth in Addendum).
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STATEMENT OF CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This case arises out of the improper administration of a family trust by a
tiustee, Diane Nolen. After agreeing to serve as Co-Trustee of the Oates Family
Trust, Nolen appropriated significant sums of money from the Trust for her own
benefit and concealed her conduct from Trust beneficiaries. Nolen also influenced
her Co-Trustee (one of the original Trustors) to transfer to Nolen a significant asset
(the Oxford/Santa Fe real estate investment, worth almost $800,000) that would
otherwise have been in the Trust, without notifying the other Trust Beneficiaries.
After the death of Nolen' s Co-Trustee, some of the Trust beneficiaries
became suspicious when Nolen informed them that the Oxford/Santa Fe asset,
which they had understood from the original Trustor would be in the Trust had
been transferred to Nolen. When beneficiaries asked for an accounting of her
administration of the Trust, Nolen (relying on advice from the Trust's attorney and
her personal attorney) refused.
The Trust's attorney advised Nolen not to speak with Trust beneficiaries and
instructed the beneficiaries to direct any inquiries to the attorney.

After trying

unsuccessfully to get information from Nolen and the Trust attorney for about a
year, some of the beneficiaries filed suit against Nolen, seeking an accounting,

4
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removal of Nolen as trustee and recovery of the asset they believed had been
wrongfully transferred to Nolen (''Nolen Lawsuit"). The court ruled that Nolen had
breached her fiduciary duty, granted the requested accounting, and removed Nolen
as trustee.

The long-awaited accounting revealed that Nolen had transfen-ed to

herself (or spent on her own behalf) approximately $265,000 of Trust funds. The
Nolen Lawsuit resulted in a settlement agreement pursuant to which Nolen agreed to
forego her share of the remaining assets in the Trust and to pay to the Trust
$150,000, in exchange for the successor trustee waiving all claims against Nolen.
The current lawsuit is against Lyle Drake, an attorney hired to represent the
Trust and Nolen in her capacity as trustee, and Daniel Maynard, an attorney hired to
represent Nolen personally, for their roles in facilitating or concealing Nolen's
misconduct.

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
Stagg Eldercare Services, as the court-appointed independent successor

trustee ("Trustee") of the Oates Family Trust, commenced this legal malpractice
action on behalf of the Trust on January 15, 2010, 1 against Lyle Drake and his
firm, Durham, Jones & Pinegar, P.C. (collectively referred to as "Drake"); and
Daniel Maynard and his firm, Maynard Cronin Erickson Curran & Sparks, P.L.C.
(collectively refe1Ted to as "Maynard").

R. 1-22. The Trustee asserted claims

1

Kara Cattani was substituted as the plaintiff by order of the trial court entered on
December 24, 2012, after she took over as Trustee. R. 576-78.
5
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against Drake and Maynard for:

(1) professional negligence; (2) breach of

contract; (3) constructive· tmst; (4) unjust enrichment; and (5) breach of fiduciary
duty.

R. 492-513.

Additionally, the Trustee asserted a claim of aiding and

abetting a breach of fiduciary duty against Maynard. Id.
On April 14, 2010, Drake filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). R. 71-73. The Trustee filed a response on June 2, 2010, and Drake filed
a reply on June 23, 2010. R. 77-198. More than two years later, on August 13,
2012, the trial court entered an order granting Drake's motion in part. R. 412-16.
Specifically, the trial court held that the Trustee's claims were partially
barred by collateral estoppel as a result of a prior suit filed by some (but not all) of
the Trust beneficiaries against Nolen and Drake. R. 413-14 (relying on Cattani v.

Nolen (Civil No. 060502429)). The trial court reasoned that the court in Cattani v.
Nolen had ruled that an interest in a partnership, Oxford/Santa Fe, LTD, "was
never an asset of the [Trust] and that Ms. Nolen did not breach any fiduciary duty
by acquiring that Partnership Interest," and therefore it necessarily followed that
Ms. Nolen's "resistance of the beneficiaries' efforts to obtain the Partnership
Interest" and "the advice of [Drake] regarding the Partnership Interest" also were
not breaches of fiduciary duty. R. 413-14. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed
the Trustee's claims against Drake regarding the Oxford/Santa Fe asset "and any

6
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issues that flow from it, including Plaintiffs claims against [Drake] regarding
conflicts of interest or breaches of fiduciary duty that are based upon the transfer of
the Partnership Interest to Diane Nolen and the efforts of Ms. Nolen to retain that
Partnership Interest." R. 413.
Drake then filed a motion for summary judgment on December 20, 2013,
with respect to the Tmstee's remaining claims against him.

R. 713-984.

The

Tmstee opposed that motion, R. 993-2258, and Drake filed his reply. R. 23262548.

On September 11, 2014, the trial court granted summary judgment for

Drake. R. 2737-2739.
Maynard then filed a motion for summary judgment on Febmary 3, 2015, as
to all the Trustee's claims against him. R. 2915-3177. The Trustee opposed that
motion, R. 3194-3574, and Maynard filed his reply. R. 3578-3606. On June 12,
2015, the trial court granted summary judgment for Maynard. R. 3626-3638.

III.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT.

The trial court dismissed some of the Trustee's claims based on collateral
estoppel, and granted summary judgment as to all the remaining claims.

The

Tmstee filed a notice of appeal on July 10, 2015. R. 3639. 2

2

As this Court noted in its order filed October 8, 2015, the trial court did not enter
a final appealable order until October 1, 2015, R. 3689, but the notice of appeal
was deemed to have been timely filed because it "relates forward to the entry of the
final order." Order, dated 10/8/15.
7
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Ernest and Florence Oates executed a Trust Agreement in 1971, thereby
~

creating the Oates Family Trust, which underlies this litigation. R. 1000 at

,r

1.

The Trust provided for the care and maintenance of Ernest and Florence during
their lifetimes. R. 1000 at ii 3. Upon the death of either of them, the Trust was to
be divided into Trust "A" and Trust "B". Id. Trust "B" was to hold the unified
credit amount for tax purposes, and Trust "A" was to hold everything else. R.
1000 at iJ 4.
Their four children-Ernest Donald Oates, Caroline Elaine Woolley, Irene
Cattani and Diane Nolen-were designated as remainder beneficiaries. R. 1000-01
at ,r 5.
When Ernest died in 1996, Florence became trustee of the Trust. R. 1001 at

~,r 6,

10. Under the terms of the Trust, the Trustors (Ernest and Florence) could

~

alter, amend, revoke or terminate the Trust while they both were alive; "[u ]pon the
death of either of the Trustors, however, this Trust shall become irrevocable and
Cij

unamendable." R. 1624 at§ I(A).
Ernest left a will that named Florence as his personal representative and
provided that his property would go into the Trust. R. 1001 at if 9. However, his
will was never probated. R. 1001 at 110.
8
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Prior to Ernest's death, one of the remainder beneficiaries of the Trust, Irene
Cattani, was injured during a medical procedure to. treat a brain tumor, which left
her disabled and incapable of managing her own affairs. As a result, she requires
24-hour care and has lived with her son/guardian, Kent Cattani, since 1985. R.
1002 at

,r

12. A few years after Ernest's death, in September 1999, two of the

remainder beneficiaries (Ernest Donald Oates and Caroline Elaine Woolley) died
in an automobile accident. R. 1002 at 111.
Shortly after that automobile accident, Florence asked Diane Nolen-the
youngest and only surviving child able to do so-to serve as co-trustee of the
Tmst. R. 1002 at

1 13.

Nolen verbally agreed to do so, and then the following

month (October 1999) was present when Florence executed a document entitled
"Appointment of Trustee" which forn1ally acknowledged Nolen's appointment as
co-trustee with Florence. R. 1002-03 at iI113, 15-19.
Florence died on December 10, 2005, at the age of 94. R. I 004 at

iJ 24.

Upon Florence's death, Nolen became the sole trustee of the Trust. Id.
Shortly after Florence's death, Nolen told Irene Cattani' s children that
Florence had, several years earlier, transferred to Nolen an interest (worth almost
$800,000) in the Oxford/Santa Fe partnership. R. 1004 at

,r 25;

R. 2021. Years

earlier, Ernest had explained to Irene Cattani's children that he had made the
investment in Oxford/Santa Fe with Nolen's husband, Phil Nolen, that this

9
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investment was one of his most significant assets, and that it would be in the Trust
for Florence's benefit during her lifetime, and then would be available for his
children, including Irene Cattani. R. 1001 at

,r,r 7-8.

Nolen's disclosure that the

Oxford/Santa Fe partnership interest had been transfen-ed to her was a concern to
Irene Cattani 's children because that transfer was contrary to what Ernest had
previously explained. R. 1004 at ,r 26.
In early January 2006, Kara Cattani, a daughter of Irene Cattani, wrote to
Nolen requesting an explanation of the transfer of the Oxford/Santa Fe asset.
R. 1004 at ,I 27. Kent Cattani wrote to Lyle Drake, (the attorney who represented
the Trust and Nolen, in her capacity as Trustee) requesting copies of all Trust
documents. R. 721 at

,r 3; 726

at

,r,r 21-22;

1004 at

,r 28. 3

After these requests,

Nolen refused to speak to or communicate directly with members of the Cattani
family. R. 1004-05 at ,r,r 29, 31.
The Trust provides that the oldest Trust beneficiary is entitled to an
accounting "on demand." R. 100 5 at ,r 34; R. 1631 at § VIII ("Accounting shall be
made only to the oldest adult beneficiary of any trust hereunder at such time as said

3

Although Drake later tried to claim that he had never represented the Trust,
R. 726 at ,r 24, his own att01neys stated in 2007 that "Mr. Drake and the Firm will
be withdrawing from their representation of the Trust" because his firm had "an
actual or potential conflict of interest with its client, the Trust." R. 2122; see also
R. 1563.
10
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beneficiary shall demand."). After Florence died, Irene Cattani was the oldest
living Trust beneficiary. R. 1005 at ,r 33.
From January to May of 2006, Kent Cattani (Irene's guardian) tried on
several occasions to obtain an accounting of the Trust during the time that Nolen
served as a Trustee. R. 1005-06 at

1, 30, 37.

Drake advised Nolen that she was

not required to .provide an accounting for the period prior to Florence's death,
when Nolen served as Co-Trustee. R. 727 at 128. Drake told Nolen that he would
take care of responding to the requests from the Cattanis. R. 1005 at 1 32. Drake
repeatedly told Trust beneficiaries that they were only entitled to an accounting for
the period of time commencing upon Florence's death.
In February or March 2006, Daniel Maynard, an attorney whom Nolen
retained to represent her personal interests against the claims being asserted by the
Cattanis (R. 2935 at iliI 21-22), contacted Kent Cattani and invited him to meet to

tJ.y to "resolve this matter." R. 1005 at ,r 35. At this meeting, Kent Cattani again
asked for a complete accounting of all Trust activity from the time Nolen was first
appointed as a Trustee.

Maynard did not provide any information regarding

monies given to or taken by Nolen. R. 1005 at ,r 36. Maynard did, however, tell
Kent, "of course, you're entitled to an accounting for the period of time when she's
been the trustee." R. 3207 at ,r 19. Referring to documents on his desk, Maynard
stated that Kent would be surprised when he learned how much money had gone

11
5183365v 1 ( 65011.1)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

through the Trnst's accounts, implying that Maynard had access to documents
evidencing funds that had been spent from the Trnst's accounts, and that he had
reviewed the documents and was familiar with what money had gone through the
Trust's accounts. R. 3207 at iJ 20.
Drake wrote a lengthy letter on April 8, 2006, to all the Trust beneficiaries.
R. 1997-2003. Drake's letter did not provide the requested accounting, but instead
focused on defending both his and Nolen's actions. R. 1006 at iJ 38. Among other
things, Drake asse1ied the following:
(1) there was "not even a hint" of any valid reason why Nolen should not be
appointed as personal representative under Florence's will;
(2) there was no sound legal basis to seek removal of Nolen as Trnstee of the
Trust;
(3) anyone wishing to remove Nolen as Trnstee would need to file a lawsuit
against Nolen, and the likelihood that any such suit would succeed was
''miniscule";
(4) the costs of defending such a suit against Nolen would be paid by the
Trust, thereby reducing the amount available for distribution to the beneficiaries,
and the costs of prosecuting such a suit would be paid out of the suing
beneficiaries' own funds; thus, "anyone would be throwing money away to attempt
such a suit"·

'
12
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(5) any person opposing Nolen's appointment as personal representative

~

would subject that person to the risk of losing their inheritance under Florence's
will;
(6) Florence would be appalled by the thought of any of her grandchildren
questioning Nolen's service as Trustee or questioning the transfer of the
Oxford/Santa Fe interest to Nolen; and
(7) Nolen "has done nothing improper, and the aspersions cast upon her are
unwarranted." R. 1006-07 at

,r 39.

Maynard received and saw this letter from

Drake. R. 3208 at ,r 23.
Because Nolen and Drake still refused to provide the requested accounting,
Kent Cattani hired an attorney, Robert Barlow, who wrote a letter on May 10,
2006, to Drake and Maynard, asking them to clarify who they represented and to
again request an accounting for the period commencing when Nolen became a
Trustee. R. 1007 at

'if1 40-41.

Nearly a month later, on June 7, 2006, Maynard

responded to Barlow, providing no new information but promising that he and
Drake would provide a status report in a few weeks. R. 1007 at ,r 42.
On August 16, 2006, Drake sent a letter addressed to all the beneficiaries of
the Trust and/or Florence's estate. R. 1007 at ,I 43; R. 2010-14. Although Nolen
did not instmct Drake to withhold the accounting Barlow (and the Cattanis) had
requested, R. 1008 at

,r 45,

Drake took the position that "Florence was the only

13
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person entitled to an accounting of trust administration matters occurring during
her lifetime."

Although Drake acknowledged that accountings for that period

could be prepared, he did not prepare one or direct Nolen to do so, stating instead
that that the Trust beneficiaries' "request of past accountings is silly." R. 1008 at

144. Drake again gave specific examples of several gifts that Florence had made
to other children and grandchildren, but he did not disclose any of the transfers that
Nolen had made to herself. R. 1008 at 1 46.
Drake's August 2006 letter further attempted to dissuade Trust beneficiaries
from seeking an accounting by asserting that such an accounting "would involve
considerable expense, further reducing the amount available for distribution to the
beneficiaries," that "it is in everyone's best interest to refrain from conduct that
will serve only to delay distribution and decrease the amount available for
distribution" and that "[f]urther delay and expense . . . benefits none of you."

R. 1008 at ,I 47.
Maynard participated in the preparation of Drake's August 2006 letter.
R. 3209 at~ 29. Notwithstanding his apparent knowledge of funds that had been

spent from the Trust for Nolen's personal benefit, Maynard did not advise Nolen
that she had a duty to provide an accounting that covered the period when Nolen
served as a Co-Trustee with Florence. R. 3210 at iJ 33.

14
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Finally, after trying for a year to obtain an accounting, some (but not all) of
the Trust beneficiaries filed suit against Nolen and Drake in December 2006 (the
"Nolen Lawsuit"), seeking to have Nolen removed as Trustee, to obtain an
accounting, and to recover the Oxford/Santa Fe asset which they believed had been
wrongfully transferred to Nolen. R. 1008 at 'TI 48; see also R. 746-56. Even after
the Nolen Lawsuit was filed, Drake and Maynard persisted in their refusal to
provide an accounting or any additional documents reflecting the Trust's financial
activity. R. 1009 at if 50.
In the Nolen Lawsuit, the court granted the accounting the beneficiaries had
long requested.

R. 161 (trial court order stating "[t]he Court has granted the

accounting requested"). Nolen was removed as Trustee and replaced by a thirdparty trustee, Stagg Eldercare Services. R. 2084. The court also granted partial
summary judgment to the beneficiaries, ruling that Nolen had breached her
fiduciary duty to provide an accounting of the Trust for the period prior to
Florence's death when she served as Co-Trustee. R. 3213 at 147; see also R. 164.
The first of the documents finally disclosed relating to the administration of
the Trust during Nolen's service as trustee were not produced until October 2007,
several months after Drake withdrew as counsel for the Trust and its Trustee, and
after both the Trust and the beneficiaries had spent thousands of dollars in
attorneys' fees over the accounting issue. R. 1009 at 'IT 51. The thousands of pages
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of documents eventually disclosed revealed the following:

(1) Nolen had used

Trust funds to pay her personal mortgage monthly payment on numerous
occasions; (2) she had used a Trust credit card for numerous personal expenditures;
(3) beginning in September 2002, all of the Trust's financial and tax statements
were mailed to Nolen at her home in Colorado, when Florence (who was then 92
years old) was moved to a senior care residence in Provo, Utah; and (4) after
becoming a Co-Trustee, Nolen transferred to herself (or spent on her own behalf)
approximately $265,000 (not counting the pmported transfer of the Oxford/Santa
Fe asset, the value of which, by itself, was almost $800,000). R. 1009-10 at ,I,r 5253; R. 1003 at ,r 20; R. 2021.
Nolen's transfers included $47,500 paid to a Denver-area supermarket to
purchase "coupons" (essentially, gift certificates), which Nolen sold and pocketed
the money. R. 3212 at

1 43.

Nolen's transfers also included at least $18,000 in

checks that she wrote and signed to a partnership in which her husband was a
partner, which she admitted was for her own personal benefit. R. 3212 at 144.
Nolen claimed that the transfers of these funds were authorized by Florence,
but Nolen acknowledged there was no evidence to support her claim. R. 1003 at il
21; R. 1010 at

~

54. Although Florence had given generous gifts to her other

children and grandchildren, those gifts were known to other family members and
were not kept secret. R. 1003 at ,I 22. By contrast, the transfers to Nolen while she
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was Co-Trustee were made without any indication that Florence was aware they
were being made and were not disclosed to other family members. R. 1003 at ,I 23.
On June 8, 2007, Drake sent a letter to the Trust beneficiaries in which he
continued to refuse to aclmowledge that Nolen had a conflict of interest in
remaining as Trustee, while at the same time claiming that the Oxford/Santa Fe
was her personal asset despite the Trust beneficiaries' claim that it was a Trust
~

asset, and notwithstanding her refusal to provide an accounting. R. 1010 at ,r 56.
Drake also denied his own conflict of interest in supporting Nolen' s personal claim

~

to the Oxford/Santa Fe asset, rather than the Trust's interests. R. 1011 at ,r 58.
However, the next month Drake's att01ney in the Nolen Lawsuit sent a letter
dated July 19, 2007, to the beneficiaries' attorney, stating that "Mr. Drake and the
Finn will be withdrawing from their representation of the Trust" because the
litigation and the beneficiaries' attempts to communicate with Drake in his role as
attorney for the Trust had "put the Firm in a position where it has an actual or
potential conflict of interest with its client, the Trust." R. 1011 at ,r 59; R. 212223; see also R. 1563-64. Drake's attorney also asserted that Drake's attorneyclient relationship had been "strictly" with the Trust. R. 1011 at
R. 1012 at

,r 60;

see also

,1 61-62, 64 (Drake argued in the Nolen Lawsuit that he "was hired
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solely to represent the Trust and the trustees" and "owed duties to the Trust and to
the trustee"). 4
From the date of Florence's death in December 2005 through mid-2007
when he withdrew from representing the Trust, Drake received at least $30,774.42
in fees paid by the Trust. R. 1012 at il 65. Nolen used Trust assets to pay not only
Drake, but also Maynard and other attorneys to defend her personal efforts to
remain as Trustee, her refusal to provide an accounting, and her efforts to retain
both the Oxford/Santa Fe asset and the funds she took from the Trust. R. 1013 at

,I 66. Drake advised Nolen that she could use Trust assets to pay him, Maynard,
and other attorneys to defend her claimed right to retain the Oxford/Santa Fe asset
and her refusal to account to the beneficiaries. R. 1013 ·at ,r 67.

4

The com1 in the Nolen Lawsuit agreed that Drake owed his "duties and loyalty to
the tmst." R. 1012 at ,r 63.
18
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial comi erroneously concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred
certain claims asserted by the Trustee.

That doctrine has no application here

because the Trustee (the plaintiff in this litigation) was not a party in the prior
Nolen Lawsuit, and is not in privity with the beneficiaries who brought the prior
Nolen Lawsuit. Moreover, the issues presented in this case relating to Drake and
Maynard's liability to the Trust were not decided in the prior Nolen Lawsuit.
fp

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Drake. Both the law
and disputed issues of fact preclude summary judgment with respect to whether
Drake's conduct in representing the Trust was negligent in advising Nolen that she
was not required to provide an accounting, that she did not have a conflict of
interest, and that she could use Tmst assets to further her own personal interests
(against the interests of the Trust). Similarly, disputed issues of fact also preclude
summary judgment with respect to the independent Trustee's claims for breach of
fiduciary duty against Drake.
Finally, the trial court also e1Ted in granting summary judgment for
Maynard. Specifically, the trial court erred in dismissing the Trustee's claim for
unjust enrichment based on the erroneous holding that the Trustee had waived that
claim by settling with Nolen in the prior Nolen Lawsuit. The trial court also erred
19
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in dismissing the Trustee's claim for aiding and abetting Nolen's breaches of
fiduciary duty by improperly weighing the evidence and deciding disputed fact
issues.
Accordingly, the trial court's grant of the motion to dismiss, grant of
summary judgment for Drake and grant of summary judgment for Maynard must
be reversed.

(j
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRUSTEE'S CLAIMS AGAINST DRAKE AND MAYNARD
ARE NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.

The trial court rejected-on res judicata grounds-some of the independent
Trustee's claims against Drake and Maynard, finding that they were previously
addressed in the lawsuit filed by some of the Trust beneficiaries. But res judicata
should not have been applied because the Trustee was neither a party to the prior
suit nor in privity with the plaintiffs in the prior suit, and because the arguments
addressed in the prior suit differed from those at issue here.
"Res judicata" is the term the Utah Supreme Court uses "to refer to the
overall doctrine of the preclusive effects to be given to judgments." Brigham
Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19,

iJ 25, 110 P.3d 678, 686

overruled on other grounds by Madsen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA., 2012 UT

51, ,I 25, 296 P.3d 671 (quoting Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp. (In re General
Detennination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water), 1999 UT 39,

P.2d 65).
preclusion.

,r

15, 982

The overall doctrine has two branches: claim preclusion and issue

Id.

"'Claim preclusion c01Tesponds to causes of action; issue

preclusion corresponds to the facts and issues underlying causes of action."' Moss
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v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2012 UT 42,

~

20,285 P.3d 1157, 1163

(quoting Allen v. Moyer, 2011 UT 44, ,r 6 & n. 6, 259 P .3d 1049).
Claim preclusion applies only when the following tlrree
elements are satisfied: (I) "both suits must involve the
same parties or their privies," (2) "the claim that is
alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first
suit or be one that could and should have been raised in
the first action," and (3) "the first suit must have resulted
in a final judgment on the merits.

Id

,r 21.
The ele~ents of issue preclusion are similar, but not identical.
Issue· preclusion applies only when the following four
elements are satisfied: (i) the party against whom issue
preclusion is asserted was a pa1iy to or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in
the prior adjudication was identical to the one presented
in the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action was
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first
suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits.

Id ,I 23 (quoting Jensen ex rel. Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ,r 41, 250 P.3d
465).
Although the two branches of the res judicata doctrine differ in their
application and effect, two elements are necessary for application of either branch:
the party against whom the doctrine is asserted must have been a party to the prior
action, or in privity with a pa1iy to the prior suit, and the first suit must have
resulted in a final judgment on the merits.

Additionally, in order for issue

preclusion, sometimes called collateral estoppel, to apply, the issue decided in the
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prior case must be identical to the one presented in the instant action and must have
been completely, fully, and fairly litigated in the first action.

Because these

elements are missing in this case, the Tmstee's claims are not ban-ed by either
branch of the res judicata doctrine.
A.

The Trustee Is Not in Privity with the Beneficiaries Who Brought the
Prior Lawsuit.

It is not disputed that the Trustee, who is the plaintiff in this case, was not a
party to the claims against Drake (or Maynard) in the Nolen Lawsuit. The trial
comi held, however, that the Trustee was in privity with the beneficiaries who did
assert those claims. That holding, and the finding of res judicata that depended
upon it, were erroneous.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that '"preclusion based on privity is
an exception to the "deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his
own day in court,""' Brigham Young Univ, 2005 UT 19 at iJ 28, 110 P.3d 678, 686
Gj

(quoting Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 453-54 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting Richards
v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996))). Further, there is a "'general

consensus in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment
~

in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he

has not been made a party by service of process."' Id. (quoting Richards, 517 U.S.
at 798). Because '" [d]ue process concerns are present ... when a party sought to
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be precluded was not an actual party in. the first lawsuit,'" '"courts must ensure that
the relationship between the party to the original suit and the party sought to be
precluded in the later suit is sufficiently close to justify preclusion."' Id. (quoting
Tyus, 93 F.3d at 454). The standard in Utah is to "'resolve all doubts in favor of
permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy."'
Id.

~ 28,

110 P .3d 678, 687 (quoting Baxter v. Utah Dep 't of Transp., 705 P .2d

1167, 1169 (Utah 1985)).
'"The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so
identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. . . .
[P]rivity depends mostly [on the parties'] relationship to the subject matter of the
litigation."' Hansen v. Bank of New York Mellon, 2013 UT App 132, iJ 7, 303 P.3d
1025, 1027 (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Press Publ'g, Ltd. v. Mato! Botanical Int'!, Ltd., 2001 UT 106,

,r 20,

37

P.3d 1121).
In this case, the trial court erred by focusing on the closeness of the
relationship between the Trustee and the beneficiaries to each other, and ignoring
the critical differences between their respective relationships to the subject matter
of the litigation. All of the malpractice claims against Drake were dismissed from
the Nolen Lawsuit precisely because the beneficiaries who were the plaintiffs in
that case did not have the requisite relationship to the subject matter of the
24
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litigation. The trial court in the Nolen Lawsuit held that Drake's duties were owed
not to the beneficiaries who brought that claim, but to the Trust, and therefore, the
claims against Drake could be brought by only the Trustee. R. 134-38.
Thus, the plaintiffs in the prior action had a very different relationship to the
subject matter of the litigation against Drake than the Trustee has in this case.
Because the Trustee here represents a different legal right than the beneficiaries
were able to represent in the Nolen Lawsuit, privity cannot exist. It would be
contrary to the due process concerns expressed by the Supreme Court if the Trustee
could be precluded from bringing the Trust's claims on the basis that the
beneficiaries' prior claims were dismissed because only the Trustee could legally
assert them.

B.

The Issue Presented in the Nolen Lawsuit Is Not Identical to the Issue
Presented in this Case.

The trial court purported to limit its res judicata ruling to "the Trustee's
claims against Mr. Drake and DJP regarding the Oxford/Santa Fe, LTD pa1inership
interest . . . and any issues that flow from it."

R. 413

However, the issues

"regarding the Oxford/Santa Fe, LTD partnership interest" presented here are not
identical to the issues decided in the Nolen Lawsuit. The trial court therefore erred
in applying the collateral estoppel branch of res judicata to this case.
For example, the ruling in the Nolen Lawsuit addressed whether the
Oxford/Santa Fe asset should have passed as a matter of law to the T1ust. It did
25
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not address whether Nolen unduly influenced Florence to persuade her to transfer
that asset to Nolen.
Indeed, the only issues regarding the Oxford/Santa Fe partnership interest
that were decided in the Nolen Lawsuit were: (1) The Oxford/Santa Fe partnership
interest did not become an asset of the Trust; and (2) Because Nolen was not a
Trustee of the Trust at the time she acquired her interest in the Oxford/Santa Fe
partnership interest, she did not breach any fiduciary duties by acquiring that asset.
R. 140-56.

Regardless whether those issues were con-ectly resolved-and the Trustee
asserts they were not-their resolution did not resolve the pending claims against
Drake and Maynard. Not decided in the Nolen Lawsuit were the following issues
related to the Oxford/Santa Fe partnership interest that are germane to the present
case: (1) Did Nolen acquire the partnership interest. through undue influence?;
(2) Was it negligent for Drake and Maynard to fail to advise Nolen that because of
her close relationship with her mother at the time she acquired the partnership
interest, there is a legal presumption that she acquired the partnership interest
through undue influence?; (3) Was it negligent5 for Drake and Maynard to advise

5

This question must be examined in light of the beneficiaries' claims that Nolen
had improperly acquired the partnership interest, and the undisputed fact that if the
partnership interest had remained in Florence's ownership until her death it would
have been devised to the Trust through Florence's will.
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~

Nolen that she did not have a conflict of interest regarding the partnership interest
that required her to withdraw as Trustee?; and (4) In light of the dispute regarding
the partnership interest, which called into question Nolen' s fealty to T1ust
beneficiaries, was it negligent for Drake and Maynard to advise Nolen that she had
no duty to provide an accounting of the period during which she was Co-Trustee
with Florence?
When, as here, the issues determined in a prior proceeding are different from
the issues presented in the later proceeding, collateral estoppel cannot apply. See,

Brigham Young University, 2005 UT 19 at ,r 34, 110 P.3d 678, 688. 6
For all the reasons discussed above, the trial court erred in granting Drake's
motion to dismiss based on res judicata. Accordingly, the trial court's res judicata
ruling should be reversed.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
JUDGMENT FOR DRAKE.

IN

GRANTING

SUMMARY

The T1ustee asserted claims against the Trust's former attorney, Drake, for
legal malpractice. "Legal malpractice is a general term used to describe a lawyer's

6

Although Appellees' failure to satisfy either the privity or the same-issue prongs
of the analysis precludes application of res judicata, the Trustee further notes that
the final requirement-that there be a final judgment in the prior proceeding-was
also not met. If a ruling or order prepared by the district comi does not explicitly
direct that no additional order is necessa1y, the ruling or order is not a final
appealable order. Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, if1 27-32, 201
P.3d 966; see also Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(f)(2). No final order meeting
the Giusti requirements was ever entered in the Nolen Lawsuit.
27
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wrongful action or omission that causes injury to a client. 'Clients wronged by
their lawyers may sue for damages based on breach of contract, breach of fiduciary
duty, or negligence.)" Christensen & Jensen, P. C. v. Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT
64,

1 21,

194 P .3d 931 (quoting Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P .2d

1283, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)).
In this case, the Trustee asserted that Drake was liable for both negligence
and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court's grant of summary judgment for
Drake was erroneous and should be overturned.

A.

The Law and Disputed Fact Issues Preclude Summary Judgment on
the Trustee's Claims of Negligence Against Drake.

The Trustee asserted that Drake fell below the standard of care by:
(1) advising Nolen that she had no duty to provide an accounting for the period
from her appointment as Co-Trustee to the date of Florence's death, even though
she in fact had such a duty; (2) advising Nolen that she did not have a conflict of
interest, even though she did; and (3) advising Nolen that she could use Trust
assets to help her maintain her personal interests (including the payment of her
personal attorney's fees) against the Trust's interests, even though she could not.
"In a legal malpractice action based on negligence, a plaintiff must prove '(i) an
attorney-client relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client arising from
their relationship; (iii) a breach of that duty; (iv) a causal connection between the
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breach of duty and the resulting injury to the client; and (v) actual damages."'

Id. ,I 22 (quoting Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433,439 (Utah 1996)).
Here, there is no dispute that Drake had an attorney-client relationship with
the Trust and Nolen (in her capacity as Trustee, but not in her individual capacity).
Nor can there be any question that Drake therefore had "a duty 'to use such skill,
p1udence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly
possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks which they undertake."'

Watkiss & Saperstein v. Williams, 931 P.2d 840, 846 (Utah 1996) (quoting
Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988) (plurality) (Howe, J.)). Rather
than fulfilling that duty, Drake actively represented Nolen's personal interests to
the Trust's detriment. At the very least, there are factual issues as to whether
Drake's services fell below the standard of care.
Drake's advice regarding an accounting fell below the standard
of care.

1.

The facts in the record before the trial court demonstrate that Drake advised
Nolen that she was not required to provide the other beneficiaries with an
accounting of the Trust from the time she was appointed Co-Trustee in 1999 to the
date of Florence's death in 2005. That advice was wrong, and because there was
evidence that it fell below the applicable standard of care, the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment.
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Utah's Uniform Probate Code specifically addresses when a trustee must
provide information to qualified beneficiaries. First, "[e]xcept to the extent the
terms of the trust provide otherwise, a trustee shall keep the qualified beneficiaries
of the trust reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and of the
material facts necessary for them to protect their interests." Utah Code Ann. § 757-811(1). The terms of the Trust in this case modify that requirement as follows:
"Accounting shall be made only to the oldest adult beneficiary of any trust
hereunder at such time as said beneficiary shall demand." R. 1631 (Trust at § VII).
But even as modified, that requirement demonstrates that Drake's advice was
clearly wrong. It is undisputed that in January 2006, when Kent Cattani requested
an accounting in his capacity as Irene Cattani' s guardian, Irene Cattani was the
oldest living Trust beneficiary and was therefore entitled to demand an accounting
of Nolen. R. 1005 at ,r 33. Accordingly, Nolen was required-under both§ 75-7811 (1) and the tenns of the Trust-to provide the requested accounting.
Furthermore, the § 75-7-811 (3) also mandates:
A trustee shall send to the qualified beneficiaries who
request it, at least annually and at the termination of the
trust, a report of the trust property, liabilities, receipts,
and disbursements, including the amount of the tmstee's
compensation or a fee schedule or other writing showing
how the trustee's compensation was determined, a listing
of the trust assets and, if feasible, their respective market
values.
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-7~811(3) (emphasis added). Importantly, unlike the other
subsections of this statute, this requirement (to provide an accounting at least
annually to beneficiaries who request it) is not limited by the qualification:
~

"Except to the extent the te11ns of the trust· provide otherwise." Thus, Drake's
advice to Nolen in her capacity as Trustee was clearly wrong and fell below the
standard of care.
The trial court nevertheless granted summary judgment for Drake on the
accounting issue based on the plainly erroneous conclusion that the requested
accounting was not required under Utah law:
While it is true that Utah has a prov1s10n reqmrmg
trustees to account for trust assets, under the directives in
the trust, Drake's interpretation of the trust provisions
regarding an accounting were within the bounds of
reason. A clear reading of the trust leads the court to the
conclusion that the requested accounting was not
required.
R. 2738. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, both the statute and the express terms
of the Trust required Nolen to provide the requested accounting. Contrary to the
trial court's ruling, a person serving as a co-trustee along with an incapacitated
trustor/co-trustee is not entitled to plunder a trust before the incapacitated
trustor/co-trustee's death, with no accountability to trust beneficiaries. Drake's
advice was simply wrong, and the trial comi en-ed in granting summary judgment
for Drake.
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The trial· court alternatively granted summary judgment for Drake based on
its conclusion that "[i]f there was any ambiguity [in the law], Drake was within the
bounds of judgment immunity." R. 2738. That ruling is a misapplication of the
judgmental immunity defense.
Under the judgmental immunity defense, "an attorney is not liable for an
error in judgment conce111ing a proposition of law that is debatable, uncertain,
unsettled, or tactical." 4 Ronald Mallen & Jeffrey Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
§ 33.5 at p. 642 (2012 ed.); see also Watkiss & Saperstein v. Williams, 931 P.2d
840, 846 (Utah 1996) ("If the plaintiff successfully shows that his attorney erred
under applicable law, it is well recognized that the attorney may still avoid liability
by showing that his error was the result of an uncertain, unsettled, or debatable
state of the applicable law.").
On the other hand, "[a]n attorney . . . must know elementary and settled
rules of law." Id. Indeed, "[t]he need for judgmental protection is

acorollary of

the nearly absolute responsibility of attorneys to educate themselves about general
laws, statutes, and legal propositions considered well defined." 2 Ronald Mallen &
Jeffrey Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE§ 19.4 at p. 1156 2012 ed.) (emphasis added).
Thus, the knowledge attorneys are required to have includes "those additional
principles that, though not commonly knovm, may be readily found by standard
research techniques." Id. at 19.6 at p. 1161.
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The judgmental immunity defense does not apply here because there is no
ambiguity in the law.

Both the clear language of the statute and the express

language of the Trust required Nolen to provide the accounting in response to the
Cattanis' repeated requests, beginning in January 2006. R. 1959. "The 'defense'
of judgmental immunity is based on two predicates:

(1) the status of the

proposition being unsettled or tactical; and (2) that the lawyer acted upon an
informed professional judgment, based upon the standard of care."

2 Ronald

Mallen & Jeffrey Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 19.1 at p. 1152 (2012 ed.).

7

Because there was nothing unsettled about Nolen's obligation to provide the
requested accounting, the judgmental immunity defense cannot apply, and the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment for Drake as a matter of law.
Moreover, "[u ]nless the issue is decided on undisputed facts, as a matter of
law, the issue of whether the [judgmental immunity] defense is available will be
submitted to the trier of fact."

4 Ronald Mallen & Jeffrey Smith, LEGAL

MALPRACTICE § 33.5 at p. 648 (2012 ed.). Thus, the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on this issue as a matter of law rather than submitting the issue
~

to the trier of fact.

7

Utah courts recognize this treatise as persuasive authority on the subject of
attorney malpractice. See, e.g. Christensen & Jensen, P. C., 2008 UT 64 ( citing
treatise extensively).
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For all these reasons, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for
Drake with respect to the Tmstee's claim that his advice to Nolen conce111ing the
accounting fell below the standard of care.
Drake's advice regarding a conflict of interest fell below the
standard of care.

2.

The Trustee also alleged that Drake fell below the standard of care by
advising Nolen that she did not have a conflict of interest. That advice was wrong,
and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Drake as a matter of
law.
The evidence demonstrates that some of the Trust beneficiaries claimed that
the Oxford/Santa Fe asset belonged to the Trust and not to Nolen. Nolen used her
position as Trustee of the Trust, the Trust's funds, and the Trust's attorney, to fight
against those claims. Even though Nolen's position as Trustee required her to look
out for the best interests of the Trust, Nolen very obviously was looking out for her
own best interests, to the Trust's detriment.

Nevertheless, Drake erroneously

advised Nolen that she had no conflict of interest.
The evidence also demonstrates that Nolen had a conflict of interest with
respect to her refusal to provide an accounting. It is a reasonable inference from
the facts before the trial court that Nolen resisted the request for an accounting in
order to conceal her numerous transfers of Trust assets to herself. Even though
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Nolen had a duty to respond to the request for an accounting in a way that was in
the Tmst's best interest, she chose instead to pursue her own personal interests.
The evidence also demonstrates that Nolen had a conflict of interest with
respect to her misuse of Trust funds to pay for attorneys representing her personal
interests.

It was in the Trust's best interests to not pay for Nolen's personal

attorneys; it was in Nolen's best personal interests to have the Trust pay for her
personal attorney fee obligations.
Despite the existence of these conflicts of interest, Drake incorrectly advised
Nolen and Trust beneficiaries that Nolen did not have a conflict of interest in
remaining as Trustee. The trial court nevertheless granted summary judgment for
Drake with respect to his erroneous conflict of interest advice. The trial court's
stated reasons for its ruling improperly ignore disputed facts and misstate the law.
First, the trial court rejected the Trustee's claim against Drake based on
Nolen' s conflict of interest in using Trust assets and funds for her own personal
interests based on the Court's finding that there is "no proof' that Nolen misused
Trust assets. R. 273 8. That finding is obviously wrong.
In the context of a motion for summary judgment, the trial comi was
required to view the evidence, and even reasonable inferences from that evidence,
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (in this case, the Trustee). The
Trustee presented overwhelming evidence that Nolen had transferred to herself or
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spent on her own behalf approximately $265,000 of Trust assets (not counting the
purported transfer of the Oxford/Santa Fe asset). See, e.g. R. 1009-10 at ,r,r 52-53;
R. 1685-92; 1729-1885; 2016-56; 2058-60.

The trial court clearly eITed in

ignoring that evidence. Moreover, even if Drake can point to contrary evidence,
that would simply result in a disputed fact, the existence of which precludes
summary judgment. See Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39,

,r 9

("Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of

material fact .... ").
Second, the trial court reasoned that, even if it were true that Nolen had
improperly taken Trust assets for her own purposes, "there is no evidence that
Drake lmew of the alleged misuse of trust assets" and therefore had no basis to
believe Nolen had a conflict of interest. R. 2738. However, this finding ignoresat a minimum-the evidence in the record that Drake was not only aware that
Nolen used Trust funds to pay the invoices of her personal attorney, Maynard, but
he also advised Nolen that she could do so. R. 1013 at 167. Accordingly, there is
at least some evidence that Drake was aware ofNolen's conflict of interest, and the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Drake.
Third, the trial court refused to even consider the Trustee's argument that
Drake failed to advise Nolen that she had a conflict of interest with respect to the
Oxford/Santa Fe asset. The trial court instead concluded that it was bound by the
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Nolen Lawsuit's holding that the Oxford/Santa Fe asset was not an asset of the
Trust, and therefore the Trustee was barred from even raising a claim against
Drake related to that asset. R. 2738. However, for the reasons discussed, supra at
§ I, the trial court was not bound by the Nolen Lawsuit holding.

Moreover, even if the trial court was bound by that holding, and even if
Nolen had prevailed in the lawsuit against her (she did not) that would not mean
that a conflict of interest could not exist. A fiduciary can have a conflict of interest
even if the fiduciary's personal interest is meritorious.
3.

Drake's advice regarding use of Trust assets to further Nolen's
personal interests fell below the standard of care.

Finally, the Trustee also alleged that Drake's conduct fell below the standard
of care by advising Nolen that she could use Trust assets to pursue her personal
interests (such as trying to keep assets out of the Trust and refusing to provide the
requested accounting). Drake essentially advised Nolen that she could use Trust
funds to pay for attorneys to represent her personal interests, even when her
interests were contrary to the Trust's interests. The trial court failed to specifically
address this argument, and instead erroneously granted summa1y judgment for
Drake.
Under Utah statutes, trustees may use trust funds to pay for their personal
attorneys' fees only when they defend the suit in good faith:
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If a trustee defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good
faith, whether successful or not, the trustee is entitled to
receive from the trust the necessary expenses and
disbursements, including reasonable attomey's fees,
incuffed.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004(2). In Fisher v. Fisher, 2009 UT App 305,221 P.3d
845, the siblings of a trustee of a trust established by their parents successfully
brought an action against the trustee, alleging he had engaged in self-dealing and
had used trust assets for his personal benefit. After a bench trial, the trial court
entered judgment for the siblings and rejected the trustee's request that his
attomey's fees be paid by the trust. Affirming the denial of attomeys' fees, the
majority of the appellate panel rejected the trustee's argument that he was entitled
to recover his fees under § 75-7-1004(2) because he had acted in good faith.
Noting that the litigation was caused by the trustee's self-dealing, this Court held
that "reimbursement of reasonable attorney fees used to defend against self-dealing
is not appropriate or allowed under Utah Code section 75-7-1004(2)," and "[a]n
estate should not be charged with payment of attorney fees for services occasioned
by a trustee's own self-dealing actions." Id. at ,r 32.
Accordingly, Drake's advice that the Trustee could use Trust assets to
pursue her personal interests (to the detriment of the Trust and the other
beneficiaries) fell below the standard of care. Therefore, the trial com1 effed in
granting summary judgment in favor of Drake.
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B.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact Preclude the Grant of Summary
Judgment on the Trustee's Breach ofFiducia1y Duty Claims.

The Trustee also asserted claims against Drake for breach of his fiduciary
duties. The trial court also en-ed in granting summa1y judgment as to these claims.
The essential elements for a legal malpractice claim based on breach of
fiduciary duty are: "(1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) breach of the attorney's
fiduciary duty to the client; (3) causation, both actual and proximate; and
(4) damages suffered by the client." Christensen & Jensen P.C., 2008 UT 64, iJ 23,
194 P.3d 931. The fiduciary duties of an attorney include "represent[ing] the client
with undivided loyalty," "acting with utmost fairness to clients, making full
disclosure, [and] avoiding representation which conflicts with that of the client."
Iacono v. Hicken, 2011 UT App. 377, ~ 15,265 P.3d 116.

When the facts in this case are viewed in the light most favorable to the
Trustee, they demonstrate that Drake breached his duty of loyalty to his client (the
Trust and its Trustee) by not pursuing the Trust's interests, but instead pursuing
Nolen's personal interests.

Thus, even if there had been room to debate the

reasonableness of Drake's advice to Nolen regarding the need to provide an
accounting, there was no uncertainty as to whom Drake owed his fiduciary duty of
loyalty. Drake's client (the Trust and the Trustee, as trustee) had nothing to gain
from Nolen refusing to provide the requested accounting. His conduct with respect
to the accounting (including vouching for Nolen and belittling the beneficiaries'
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efforts to obtain an accounting) benefitted only Nolen (personally) in concealing
her pattern of self-dealing throughout her tenure as Co-Trustee.
Similarly, even if there had been some reasonable debate over whether
Nolen had a conflict of interest that required her to resign as trustee, Drake's
fiduciary duties ran to the Trust, not Nolen's personal interests. On the facts in this
record, a reasonable jury could find that Drake breached his duty by defending and
supporting Nolen's personal interest in maintaining her position as Trustee.
Finally, the facts before the trial court also would allow a reasonable jury to
find that Drake breached his duty of loyalty by advising Nolen that she could use
Trust funds to pay her personal attorneys to represent her personal interests against
the interests of his client, the Trust.

Accordingly, the trial court's grant of

summary judgment on the Trustee's claims relating to Drake's breach of fiduciary
duties was improper and should be ove1turned.
C.

The Evidence of Damage to the Trust Precludes the Grant of
Summary Judgment on that Element.

Finally, Drake argued in the trial court that even if he was negligent or
breached his fiduciary duty, the Trust was not damaged by his misconduct.
However, the record contains substantial evidence of damages incurred by the
Trust, caused by Drake's breaches of duty.
The law is well-established that "[a] plaintiff is required to prove both the
fact of damages and the amount of damages." Stevens-Henager College v. Eagle
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~

Gate College, 2011 UT App 37,115,248 P.3d 1025. With respect to "the fact of
damages," "the evidence ... must give rise to a reasonable probability that the
plaintiff suffered damage." Id.

By contrast, "the standard for determining the

amount of damages is not so exacting as the standard for proving the fact of
damages." Id. Furthermore, "[g]enerally, the question of proximate cause raises
an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury for its determination." Harline v.

Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996).
In this case, the Trustee presented more than enough evidence of the fact of
the Trust's damage.

This included:

(1) the attorneys' fees Drake improperly

charged the Trust for advising Nolen in furtherance of her personal interests, in
breach of Drake's duties to the Trust; (2) the attorneys' fees the Trust was forced to
incur (both directly and by reimbursing the beneficiaries) to resist and overcome
Drake's improper advice to Nolen; and (3) the attorneys' fees the Trust paid to
Nolen's personal attorney, based on Drake's improper advice to do so. R. 1013-16
at iJiJ 71-75; R. 2151-2209; 3405-15.
Accordingly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Drake cannot
be justified on the element of damage.

To the contrary, that judgment was

improper and should be overturned.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
JUDGMENT FOR MAYNARD.

IN

GRANTING

SUMMARY

The Trustee asserted claims against Maynard for unjust enrichment and
aiding Nolen in the breach of her fiduciary duties.

The trial court's grant of

summary judgment for Maynard on these claims was erroneous and should be
overturned.
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment for Maynard
on the Unjust Enrichment Claim.

The Trustee's unjust enrichment claim against Maynard asserts that,
although Maynard represented Nolen in her personal interests, he was nevertheless
paid for his services from the Trust's assets. An unjust enrichment claim requires
proof of three elements:
( 1) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an
appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit;
and (3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the
benefit under such circumstances as to make it
inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without
payment of its value.
Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake County, 734 P.2d 910, 911 (Utah 1987).
In the trial court, Maynard did not dispute elements one and two. Instead, he
challenged only the third element, asserting that it was not inequitable for him to
retain the Trust's money because he provided legal services to Nolen. The Trustee
countered that the relevant question was not whether it is equitable for Maynard to
be paid at all, but whether the circumstances of this case make it inequitable for
42
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. Maynard to be paid by the Trust for representing Nolen's personal interests against
the Trust's interest. The trial court agreed with the Trustee, stating: "The question
is not whether Maynard's fees should have been paid; the question is whether
Maynard wrongfully received payment of his fees out of Trust funds disbursed by
Nolen as Trustee." R. 3633.
The trial court also acknowledged that "[t]here is no dispute that Maynard
~

performed the legal services for Nolen and that he was paid by Nolen from Trust
assets." R. 3633. But the trial court ultimately did not decide whether payment of
Maynard's fees from Trust assets was inequitable. Instead, the trial court granted
summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claim because: (1) the trial court
concluded that the Trustee had waived any claim to recover the fees from Maynard
because the Trustee had settled with Nolen and released her from liability for such
claims; and (2) the release of Nolen also released Maynard by operation of Utah
Code Ann. § 15-4-5. R. 3634-35. The trial court erred as a matter of law on both
points.
For a waiver to exist, there must be "the intentional relinquishment of a

Ci)

lmown right." Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 93940 (Utah 1993).

Nothing in the Trust's settlement with Nolen evidences an

intention to relinquish claims or rights against Maynard (or anyone else other than
Nolen). To the contrary, that settlement resolved claims against only Nolen: "In
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exchange for the Payment, the Trustee will waive any and all claims that it has or
has asserted or may have against Ms. Nolen." R. 3134 at ,r 6 (emphasis added).
Because the Trustee's release of Nolen does not specifically provide that the
Trustee also released Maynard, the trial court en-ed in finding a waiver of the
Trustee's claim for unjust enrichment against Maynard.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 78B-5-822 ("A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more
defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so
provides."); see also Child v. Newsom, 892 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1995) (holding that
this statute "was designed to retain the liability of tort-feasors and reverse the
common law rule 'so that release of one joint tort-feasor did not automatically
release all tort-feasors"') (quoting Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349, 1350
(Utah 1986)).
Similarly, the trial court's reliance on the Joint Obligations Act (Utah Code
Ann.§§ 15-4-1 to -5) is misplaced. The Utah Supreme Court made it clear that the
(j

enactment of§ 78B-5-822 "is a pro tanto repeal of the [Joint Obligations Act] as it
applies to regular co-defendants, but that the [Joint Obligations Act] still applies to
vicariously liable parties." Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, ~ 11, 48 P.3d
941. In this case, because the Trustee's claims against Maynard are for his own
direct fault, not for vicarious liability for Nolen's fault, the Joint Obligations Act
does not apply. ·
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Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for
Maynard on the unjust em·ichment claim, and that judgment should be overturned.
B.

The Trial Court En-ed in Granting Summary Judgment on the Claim
for Aiding and Abetting Nolen's Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

The Trustee also asserted a claim against Maynard for aiding Nolen's breach
of her fiduciary duties. This Court has held that "Utah law recognizes a cause of
action for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty." Mower v. Simpson,
2012 UT App 149,

if 38, 278

P.3d 1076. "[T]he gravamen of the claim of aiding

and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is the defendant's knowing participation in
the fiduciary's breach.". Id.

,r 37.

The trial court based its grant of summary judgment with respect to this
claim on its finding that "[t]here is no reasonable evidence that Maynard even
knew about the alleged misappropriations by Nolen until after the [Nolen Lawsuit]
was over."

R. 3636.

However, even if it were true that Maynard had no

knowledge that Nolen was breaching her fiduciary duty by misappropriating Trust
assets for her personal use, that is no basis for granting summary judgment with
respect to Nolen's other breaches of fiduciary duty of which Maynard had full
knowledge.

For example, Maynard knew of Nolen's refusal to provide the

requested accounting, and he took materials steps to assist her with that refusal.
Similarly, Maynard knew that Nolen was using Trust assets to pay his invoices,
even though he represented her in her personal interests against the Trust's
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interests. And Maynard knew that Nolen was breaching her fiduciary duty by
continuing to act as Trustee despite the existence of her conflicts of interest.
Furthermore, the trial court's rationale fails even as to Nolen's other
misappropriations of Trust assets. The evidence in the record demonstrates that
Maynard met with Kent Cattani in April 2006. During this meeting, Maynard
referred to a stack of documents on his desk and stated that Kent would be
surprised when he learned how much money had gone through the Trust's
accounts. The reasonable inferences from this evidence are that Maynard had
access to the records showing how much money had gone through the Trust, that
Maynard had already reviewed these records, and that Maynard already knew the
surprising details about how much money had been spent.

By ignoring this

evidence and the reasonable inferences from that evidence, the trial court
improperly ignored disputed issues of fact when granting Maynard's motion for
summary judgment.
The trial court also based its grant of summary judgment for Maynard on
cases from other jurisdictions which, according to the trial court, stood for the
proposition that attorneys could not be liable for aiding and abetting a client's

(il

breach of fiduciary duty unless the attorneys "acted outside the scope of their
representation and in their self-interest." R. 3636.

However, these cases are

neither controlling nor persuasive.

~
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First, with just one exception, the cases on which the trial court relied 8 did
not even address claims for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. Instead,
they addressed conspiracy claims, which were rejected because of the
"intracorporate conspiracy doctrine," which provides that "an entity cannot
conspire with one who acts as its agent." General Refractories Co. v. Fireman 's
Fund Ins. Co.; 337 F.3d 297,313 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Heffernan v. Hunter, 189
F.3d 405, 412-13 (3d Cir. 1999); Frierson-Harris v. Hough, 2006 WL 298658 *5
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
The only exception is a case out of Oregon.

Or. 338, 142 P.3d 1062 (2006).

Reynolds v. Schrock, 341

Reynolds held that lawyers have a qualified

privilege to assist their clients to breach the clients' fiduciary duties to third parties,
as long as they are acting within the scope of their attorney-client relationship. Id.
at 1068-69. Utah courts have recognized no such privilege.

Moreover, other

jurisdictions take a different view. See, e.g., Wolf v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp,
76 Cal. App. 4th 1030, 1040, 90 Cal Rptr.2d 792 (1999) (evidence suggesting that
attorneys for a trustee did not want others to learn of trustee's misconduct because
"they received a greater amount of fees" and "wished to keep receiving a greater
amount of fess" was sufficient to support claim); Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch,

8

e

The trial court referred to the "cases cited by Defendants." R. 3636. These cases
are found in Maynard's reply in support of his motion for summary judgment.
R. 3604.
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Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (1998) ("trust beneficiaries may

bring suit on their direct claims against third persons who have actively
participated with a trustee in a breach of trust for their own financial advantage,
whether by inducing, aiding or abetting the trustee's breach of duty, or by
receiving trust property from the trustee in knowing breach of trust"); Pierce v.
Lyman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326 (holding that an attorney may be liable to a trust

beneficiary for the attorney's active participation in a trustee's breach of duty if the
attorney acted in furtherance of his or her own financial gain, or committed actual
fraud by making express misrepresentations to the beneficiary).
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•
•

CONCLUSION

The trial comi's dismissal of claims based on res judicata and grants of

•

sununary judgment should be reversed, and this case remanded to the trial comi for
fu1iher proceedings.

•
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ADDENDUM
A.

Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-811

B.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004(2)

C.

Order re: Drake's motion to dismiss, 8/13/12

D.

Decision re: Drake's motion for summary judgment, 9/11/14

E.

Decision re: Maynard's motion for summary judgment; 6/12/15

F.

Declaration of Trust

52
5183365v1(65011.1)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

•

Addendum A

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

75-7-811
75-7-811. Duty to inform and report.

. (1)

Except to the extent the terms of the trust provide otherwise, a trustee shall
keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably infonned about the
administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to
protect their interests. Unless unreasonable ·under the circumstances, and
unless otherwise provided by the terms of the trust a trustee shall promptly
respond to a qualified beneficiary's request for information related to the
administration of the trust.

(2)

Except to the extent the terms of the trust provide otherwise, a trustee:

(3)

(a)

upon request of a qualified beneficiary, shall promptly furnish to the
beneficiary a copy of the portions of the trust instrument which
describe or affect the beneficiary's interest;

(b)

within 60 days after accepting a trusteeship, shall notify the qualified
beneficiaries of the acceptance and of the trustee's name, address, and
telephone number;

(c)

within 60 days after the date the trnstee acquires lmowledge of the
creation of an in-evocable trust, or the date the trustee acquires
lmowledge that a formerly revocable trust has become irrevocable,
whether by the death of the settler or otherwise, shall notify the
qualified beneficiaries of the trust's existence, of the identity of the
settlor or settlers, of the right to request a copy of the trust instrument,
and of the right to a trustee's report as provided in Subsection ill; and

(d)

shall notify the qualified beneficiaries in advance of any change in the
method or rate of the trustee's compensation.

A trustee shall send to the qualified beneficiaries who request it, at least
annually and at the termination of the trust, a report of the trust property,
liabilities, receipts, and disbursements, including the amount of the tlustee's
compensation or a fee schedule or other writing showing how the trnstee' s
compensation was determined, a listing of the trust assets and, if feasible,
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their respective market values. Upon a vacancy in a trusteeship, unless a
cotrustee remains in office, a report must be sent to the qualified
beneficiaries by the former trustee, unless the tenns of the trust provide
otherwise. A personal representative, conservator, or guardian may send the
qualified beneficiaries a report on behalf of a deceased or incapacitated
trustee.
(4)

A qualified beneficiary may waive the right to a trustee's report or other
inf01mation otherwise required to be fmnished under this section. A
beneficiary, with respect to future rep01is and other information, may
withdraw a waiver previously given.
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75-7-1004
75-7-1004 Attorney's fees and costs.

(2)

If a tmstee defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether
successful or not, the trustee is entitled to receive from the trust the
necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's fees,
incun-ed.
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PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY:
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Grant M. Swnsion (6445)
Jason S. Crandall (8327)
SUMSION & CRANDALL
101 N. University Ave. Ste. 200
Provo, UT 84601
Telephone: (801) 426-6888
Gayla Sorenson (Admitted pro hac vice)
302 Chestnut Forest Cove
Fort Wayne, IN 46814
Telephone: (215) 565-6681
i)

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STAGG ELDERCARE SERVICES, as
Trustee of the Oates Family Trust u/a/d
August 4, 1971,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 110500394

vs.
LYLE DRAKE; DURHAM, JONES &
PINEGAR, P.C,, a Utah professional
corporation; DANIEL MAYNARD; and
MAYNARD CRONIN ERICKSON
CURRAN & SP ARKS, P.L.C.,

Judge Pamela G, Heffernan

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court for hearing on February 10, 2012, at 10:00 a.m., on
Defendants Lyle Drake's ("Mr. Drake 0 ) and Durham Jones & Pinegar's ("DJP") Motion to
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Dismiss (the "Motion"), Matthew L. Lalli and Nathan E. Wheatley appeared on behalf of Mr.
Drake and DJP. Grant M, Sumsion and Gayla Sorenson appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Stagg
Eldercare Services, as Trustee of the Oates Family Trust u/a/d August 4, 1971 (the "Trustee,,).
After having considered all memoranda and supporting documents and authorities cited
therein, the arguments of counsel, the pleadings and evidence before the Court, and such other
matters the Court deemed appropriate, and for good cause shown, the Motion is hereby
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The Motion seeks to dismiss the Trustee's Complaint on two grounds. First, the Motion
asserts that the Trustee's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Second, the Motion
asserts that the Trustee's claims are barred because the claims presented therein were previously
decided by the Fifth District Court in the case of Cattani v. Nolen (Civil No. 060502429).
With respect to the assertion in the Motion that the Trustee's claims are barred by the
Statute of Limitations, the Court denies the Motion,· At this point it is not clear that the statute of
limitations would apply.
With respect to the assertion that the Trustee s claims are barred by the decision in the
1

Cattani v. Nolen case, the Court grants the Motion in part and denies it in part. The Court
GRANTS the Motion with respect to the Trustee's claims against Mr. Drake and DJP regarding
the Oxford/Santa Fe, LTD partnership i~terest (the "Partnership Interest,,) and any issues that
flow from it, including Plaintiffs claims against Mr. Drake and DJP regarding conflicts of
interest or breaches of fiduciary duty that are based upon the transfer of the Partnership Interest
to Diane Nolen and the efforts of Ms. Nolen to retain that Partnership Interest.
In Cattani v, Nolen the Court ruled that the Partnership Interest was never an asset of the
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Oates Family Trust (the "Trnst") and that Ms. Nolen did not breach any fiduciary duty by
acquiring that Partnership Interest. If there was no breach of fiduciary duty by Ms. Nolen in
acquiring the Partnership Interest there is also no breach of fiduciary duty in her continued
involvement with the Partnership Interest, her resistance of the beneficiaries' efforts to obtain the
Partnership Interest, and the advice of Mr. Drake and DJP regarding the Partnership Intere;t.
Further, because the Court ultimately determined that the Partnership Interest belonged to Ms.
Nolen, not to the Trust, there can be no conflict of interest on the part of the attorneys because
Nolen,s position was ultimately determined to be the correct position.
This Court holds that the determination of the court in Cattani v, Nolen regarding the
ownership of the Partnership Interest will not be relitigated in this case, There is a sufficient
privity between the beneficiaries who were plaintiffs in Cattani v. Nolen and the Trustee who is
Plaintiff in this case that they should be considered the same for purposes of collateral estoppel.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
A.

The Motion is DENIED with respect to the statute of limitations argument;

B.

With respect to the collateral estoppel argument, the Motion is GRANTED, in

part, in that the Trustee's claims against Mr. Drake and DJP regarding the Oxford/Santa Fe, LTD
partnership interest and any issues that flow from it; and

14893238

00041~
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

C. ·

The parties shall bear their own respective fees and costs.

DATED this

+ aF·
day of

2012,

BYT

.
istrict Cour
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 4th 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing by regular, U.S.
postage paid, to the following:
John A. Snow
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
&McCARTHY

36 South State Street, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Matthew L. Lalli
Nathan E. Wheatley
SNELL & WILMER L.L,P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004

Isl Grant M. Sumsion
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Honorable Judge Pamela Heffernan
·5t1i District Court St. George

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KARA KA TTANI, as Trustee of the OATES
FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiff

fj

~

DECISION AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

V,

Case No.: 110500394

LYLE DRAKE, an individual; DURHAM
JONES & PINEGAR, PC., a Utah
professional corporation; DANIEL
MAYNARD, an individual; and MAYNARD
CRONIS ERICKSON CURRAN &
SPARKS, P.L.C.

Judge: Hon. Pamela G. Heffernan

Defendants

This matter came before the court on September 11, 2014 on a Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by defendants Lyle Drake and Durham, Jones, and Pinegar, P.C. (hereafter
referred to as Drake). The court heard oral arguments and considered the motion, memoranda,
and all exhibits in support in reaching its decision,
DECISION:
Drake I s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
REASONING:
As the court told counsel at the hearing it is beyond the scope of this judge's role and
assignment to issue an extensive decision with citations to all areas of the record and law. It is
beyond the capacity of the resources available to this court.
Having said that the court will enumerate the basic reasoning for this decision.
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Plaintiff has three basic claims. While the claims are stated in somewhat varying ways and
with tributaries and offshoots, when everything is boiled down, it results in the following
allegations:
1. Drake was negligent in advising the former trustee that an accounting of the trust from the
time of Diane Nolen's appointment as coMTrustee to the date of Florence Oates death was not
necessary. It is undisputed that Drake as attorney for the trustee Diane Nolen advised that an
accounting to the remaining beneficiaries of the trust after Florence's death for the time period
requested was unnecessary. While it is true that Utah law has a provision requiring trustees to
account for trust assets, under the directives in the trust, Drake's interpretation of the trust
provisions regarding an accounting were within the bounds of reason. A clear reading of the
trust leads the court to the conclusion that the requested accounting was not required. If there
was any ambiguity, Drake was within the bounds of judgmental immunity which protects
attorneys who make judgments that may later be found to be in error, but are based on uncertain,
ambiguous, or otherwise unclear principles, For this reason plaintiff's claim fails.
2. Drake negligently failed to advise Nolen that she had a conflict of interest and she didn't have
a duty to resign as trustee, The court understands that this is based upon two points which will
be addressed separately.

A. Plaintiff claims that once an accounting was received of the time period in question, they
discovered that Nolen had misused over $200,000.00 of trust assets while she was co-trustee and
Florence was still alive, First, there is no proof even to this day despite over seven years of
litigation, that this is true. Second, even if it is true, there is no evidence that Drake knew of the
alleged misuse of trust assets. The beneficiaries in their quest for an accounting and removal of
Nolen as trustee did not raise any mention that they had a basis to believe there had been this
hlnd of misconduct by Nolen. Furthermore, plaintiff cannot identify any legal authority that
Drake had an affirmative duty to do an independent accounting of the trust. That kind of
requirement pits attorney and client into a situation of mistrust. It also presupposes a duty on the
part of the attorney to in effect "police" the trust. That is beyond the scope of the attorney's
responsibility and accountability. Absent some reason for concern, plaintiff points to no basis
in law for requiring an attorney to conduct that kind of inquiry. Clearly Nolen had a fiduciary
duty not to misuse trust funds, but absent active participation and knowledge of a
breach of fiduciary duty by the trustee, the attorney cannot be held responsible to third parties,
even beneficiaries. It follows that Drake breached no duty to inform Nolen of a conflict of
interest and a duty to resign under these circumstances.
B. Plaintiff claims that Drake negligently advised Nolen that she didn't have a conflict of
interest when she retained the Oxford/Santa Fe partnership interest. This court has previously
ruled in this case that the partnership interest was never an asset of the trust. Drake clearly
advised the beneficiaries that the partnership was not an asset of the trust, and, therefore, posed
no conflict of interest. The court has also ruled in this case that those claims should not even be
raised and were not raised in the Amended Complaint.
There seems to be a dearth of cases on these issues which has left the court with very little to rely
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·pn other than the arguments of counsel and common sense, Counsel for the defense stated that in
over seven years of litigation, neither side could find a similar case.
The court need not address the issue of damages since the case has been decided on the issue of
liability.
For the reasons given above as well as those stated in Drake's Memorandum and Reply in
Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the couti grants the motion and enters summary
judgment in favor of Drake.
DATED this /(

~
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IN THE FIFTH JUDI CIAN4HSTR-I&-'l'-..GQ~..[1 /::, Trr, ";.
IN AND FOR.WASl{ING~ON COUNTY, S';I'ATE OF

STAGG ELDERCARE, KARA
CATTANI, as Trustee of the OATES
FAMILY TRUST,

1 I) ,j:
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DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

LYLE DRAKE; .DURHAM, JONES &
PINEGAR, P.C., a Utah professional
corporation; DANIEL MAYNARD; and
MAYNARD CRONIN ERICKSON
CURRAN & SPARKS, P.L.C.,

Case No. 110500394

Judge Pamela G. Heffeman

Defendants.

Defendants Daniel Maynard and Maynard Cronin Eri~kson Curran & Sp&1·ks P .L.C. (hereafter

referred to collectively as "Maynard" or "Defendants,') filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against
Plaintiff Kara Cattani (hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff''). The Court has reviewed all memoranda and

exhibits and heard oral argument by counsel at a hearing on the motion on June 6, 2015.
This decision will be best understood by first presenting a brief summary of the pertinent history

of the case and the claims at issue.

History of the Case:

Trust") after Ernest died in 1996. Florence later requested that her daughter Diane Nolen serve as CoTrnstee of tl1e 'Tt\\~\. NGlen accepted the appointment to serve as Co-Trustee on or about October, 1999.

Lyle Drake was hired as counsel by Florence in 2001. Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that Drake was
1
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hired to represent her personally and as Trustee. Florence died on December 10, 2005, at which time
Nqlen bepame sole Trustee of the Trust.

In early 2006, the heirs of Florence began asserting that Nolen had acted improperly as CoTrustee. There were allegations that a partnership interest had been improperly acquired by Nolei;i while
she was Co-Trustee and that the pa11nership interest properly belonged as an asset in the Trust. Othe1·
misappropriations were suspected. Among other requests, Kent Cattani, on behalf of Irene Cattani,
demanded an accounting of Trust assets from the time Nolen became Co-Trustee of the Trust in October,
1999.

After the heirs pegan to asse1t antagonistic claims against Nolen, Nolen retained Maynard to
represent her. Maynard asserts that he was retained to repr~~ent Nol~n individually, while Plaintiff, ·in
paragraph 43 of her Amended c·omplaint alleges, "Maynatd provided legal advice to Nolen in Nolen's
i~1dividual cnpacity and il1 her capacity as [T]mstee and was paid from assets of the [T]rust for the
services he rendered,,, The nature of the attorney-client relationship between Nolen and Maynard will be
addressed later. Drake, and possibly Maynard, advised Nolen that she was not obligated to provide an
accolmting for the .period of time she was Co-Trustee. This Court, in an earlier ruling granting summary
judgment to Drake, determined that the advice given by Drake to Nolen regarding the accounting issue
was reasonable and that he was not subject to liability for such advice based upoµ the j\,ldgmental
immunity doctrine. The Court is not incli11ed to revisit this issue, just as it will not revisit its previous
mlings regardingthe partnership interest. (The Comt ruled that the partnership interest in dispute was
found by Judge Faust never to have been part of the Trust and, therefore, was not an issue in this case),

The primary focus of that litigation was to seek removal of Nolen as Trustee based on allegations of
2
,.) 0 I.,
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misappropriation of Trust assets and conflict of interest, and it also sought an accounting. There were
also objections to the payme11t ofNolen's legal fees out of the Trust, and tertiary claims against Drake.
In July of 2006 Drake resigned as attorney for the Trust, citing-a conflict of interest. Eventually Drake
was dismissed from that lawsuit and Nolen was terminated as Trustee, based shmtltaneously 011 a
stipulation from Nolen to do so and also on a motion filed by the heil's.
On October 30, 2009, the successor Trustee, Stagg Eldercare, and Nolen entered into a
settlement. In essence the settlement released all claims that the successor Trustee, Stagg Eldercare, and
Nolen had agai11st each other, including:

I. "[M]onies paid to or for the benefit of Ms. Nolen during the period of time when she
was the Trustee CGifts to Diane')";
2, The partiwrship interest Nolen received from Florence;
3. "[C]laims against Ms. Nolen to repay to the Trust certain legal fees that were paid by Ms.
Nolen while she was the Trustee. 11
In exchange for the payment of $150,000 and for waiver of any ftuther distribution from the
Trust, the settlement agreement states that "[t]he Trustee will also release Ms. Nolen from any ruid all
claims that is has asserted or alleged in its Third Amended Complaint filed in these proceed_ings or that
could have been alleged,u Ironically, Maynard signed the settlement agreement as Nolen's attorney, yet
now he is being sued for the very legal fees that were settled upon. Plaintiff contends that the settlement
agreement was intended only to settle claims against Nolen and that it reserved claims against any other
potential liable parties. Maynard, on the other hand, asserts that the settlement constitutes a waiver of
claims for attorney fees paid out of the Trust to h.im,
After the settlement, Stagg Eldercare as Trnstee brnught this lawsuit against both attorneys Drnke

was later substituted as Plaintiff for Stagg. The Court granted a_Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
3
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Drake and his law firm, Maynard now seeks summary judgment in his favor,

The -Claims:

Plaintiff's First, Second, and Fifth Claims ate "Professional Negligence,» uBreach of Contract,»
and "Breach of Fiduciary Duties/' respectively, which the Court will refer to collectively as the
Malpractice Claims. Plaii1tiff's Third and Fourt:h Claims are based 1,1pon ·claims of unjust enrichment
and constructive trust. Those claims seek to recoup attorney foes paid by Nolen to Maynard with assets
of the Trust. The Sixth Cat1se of A~tion is "Aiding and Abetting,» which is based on allegations that
Maynard substantially participated in assisting Nolen in breaching her fiduciary duties.

Tlte MnlprR"ctice Claims (First, Second, and Fifth Claims):

The fundamental underlying question that mt1st be addressed is, "Who was Maynard 1-s client?''
This is a legal issue, not a factual one. It is for the Court to determine whether and with whom an
attorney-client relationship existed.
Plaintiff implies that Maynard owed professional responsibilities to the Trust, to the Trustee, and
to the beneficiaries, At times Plaintiff refers to Maynard's client as Nolen individually, Nolen as
Trnstee, and as the Trust itself. Defendant Maynard seeks to characterize his client only as Nolen

individt1ally (although, significantly, the Reply Memorandum appears to capitt1late on this issue and

'ada1·~~vi~g~s 'tfrat 'iviayna~d "a"i'd ·l:ep'i-'esent No'ien. bi:divi cfoaiiy ·as. weH a's'Tn he1; 'capachy 'as"Ti;i.isfoe ·•agafrist ....
claims made by the beneficiaries).
4
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It is the Court's conclusion that neither side is correct except to the extent conceded to by
defendant. First, there is simply no substantial evidence that Maynard represented the Trust. It is
undisputed that Nolen retained Maynard sometime in early 2006 when the heirs became antagonistic to
Nolan as Trustee. The Trust at the time was already represented by attom~y Drake. In paragraphs 18
through 19 ofNolen,s Affidavit, it states, "Nolen makes clear that she considered Drake the attorney for
Cj

the Trust and Maynard as her personal attomey, whom she engaged after objections were made by some
of the beneficiaries to her continuing as the personal representative of her mother's estate.,, (See
Defendanes Reply Memorandum, p.4.)
After the heirs sued Nolen and Drake in December 2006, Maynard continued to represent Nolen.
There is therefore a reason to believe that Maynard advised Nolen on her duties as Trustee on same Trust
administration matters incJuding the accounting issue. Maynard himself acknowledged that it was
uimpossible to differentiate between legal work devoted to defending Diane, personally, and defending
Dicµ1e in her capacity as Trustee .... " (See Plaintiff's Memorandum for citation). That does not in itself
support a conclusion that Maynard represented the Trust, however. The expectations expressed by both
Maynard and Nolen were that Maynard was retained by Nolen to represent her individually as Trustee
against claims made against he1· by the beneficiaries. Any expressions by any of the beneficiaries that
they thought Maynard was the attomey for the Trust are gratuitous and not determinative on the issue.
The Court concludes from all the reasonable evidence that Nolen individually as Trustee of the Trust
was Maynard,s clie11t.

The issue of the attomey-client relationship is critical. Under Utah law, in nearly all instances,
oriiy a ·clie.11t

cai1 'rii"aintahi ·a 'ri1aipr,i:ctfoe"case· aiialiis't the ilttoi·11ey'.'..fo thJs case,"tlie cinlfe'ntify"or pei·s011 .

entitled to·sue Maynard for malpracti.ce is Nolen. All of the fiduciary dt1ties owed by an attorney to a

5
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client in this case flowed to the benefit of Nolen, not the Trust, the beneficiaries, or a successor trustee,
Plaintiff's contention that the attomey for the Trustee is also attorney for the Trust is also in error.
Plaintiff's reliance on the case of.Snow, Christiansen & Ma,~/ineau v. Lindbetg> 299 P. 3d 1058
(Utah 201.3), is misguided. The ntling in that case addressed an issue that 'is not pertinent·in this
litigation. The Utah Supreme Court did state ill'that case that a trnst was capable of being represented by
an attorney and forming an attomey-client relationship; however, it did not rule that an attorney for a
trustee alwctys represents the trust as well.
In this case, the Trust had been represe11ted by Drake. Maynard entered the scene as attorney for
Nolen as Trnstee and individually when the heirs began asserting claims aimed at Nolen as Trustee.
Their claims were not agah1st the Trust itself. It stands to reason, therefore, that she would have taken
this action to seek representatio11 for herself 011 those issues which she had a right to do. This Court
wants to emphasize that by stating that Nolen had the right to be represented by counsel, it is not m&king
any findings that Nolen acted appropriately or not with regard to the Trust and its assets. It is merely an
acknowledgment that she had a right to defend herself. By retaining Maynard to represent her, that is
what she did. Therefore, Defendant Maynard is entitled to S\1111111ary judgment on the First·Claim.
As to Claim 2, the breach of contract claim, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment for may
of the same i'easons. In Claim 2> Pl~intiff alleges that Maynai·d e11tered into a contract with Nolen to
represent Nolen as Trustee, She goes on to allege that the Trust is a third-party beneficiary of that
contract with Nolen. Additionally, she alleg~s that Maynal'd breached his agreement with Nolen

in

various ways and incompetently represented her, thereby causing damage to the Trust and beneficiaries.

Ciafrri ·2 s·urre·rs'fi;on1 ·t11e· sai-iie ·defec"t as· the· fl iit ·ctafrii · Mayiiai:a· ai-icCNofoi-i ·we.re 'fri ·an· attorney~·
client relationship. The duties that flow from an attorney to a client fiduciary, in this case, a trustee, do
6
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not run to others, including those to whom the fiduciary owes a duty such as the trust or beneficiaries.
This is the majority position of this issue by couits that have ruled on it. No case in Utah presents
binding authority one way or another. The Utah courts·, position on the attomey-client relationship and
the duties th.at flow from it, however, are consistent with the majority position as stated.
As to Claim 5, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment~
-again, for many of the same reasons that justify the Court's conclusions as to Claims I and 2. The
underlying false premise for this claim is that Maynard owed fiduciary duties to the Trust and
beneficiaries, As has already been stated, there was no attorney~client relationship between Maynard
a11d the Trust and beneficiaries. It follows, then, that Maynard did not owe at1y fiduciary duties to the
Trust or its beneficiaries. Therefore, they cannot maintain a claim ngainst him as a matter of law.
Stated quite simply, Maynard did not take

011 Nolen>s

fiduciary responsibilities and duties to the

Trust and beneficiaries by agreeing to represent her. To ru'le otherwise woufd confuse and misplaqe the
fiduciaty duty Maynard owed to Nolen with the fiduciary duties Nolen owed to the Tmst and
beneficiaries.

Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust Claiins (Third and Fourth Clnims):

These claims assert that Plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement for legal fees paid by Nolen to
Maynard out of Trnst assets. The unjust enrichment claim is intertwined with the constructive trust
claim in that a constructive trust is an equitable remedy for unjust enrichment. They are not really

.separate ·daim.'s' an'd"wiif be. freatect' ·as. the . coi1bhied cfabi1s' th a£ they h1. fact ·are·,

. . . .. . . . .

Plaintiff argues that Nolen wrongfully paid Maynard's legal fees out of Trust assets for a host of
7
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reasons all commonly subsumed tmder the claim. that the defense of Nolen against the beneficiaries'
claims was not of benefit to the Trt1st and was, in fact, adverse to the Trnsfs interests.
There is no dispt1te that Maynard performed the legal services for Nolen and that he was paid by
Nolen from Trust assets. It is important to 11ote thElt there are no allegations that Maynard ~omehow
received payment from the Trust by circumventing Nolen,s m,.,thorit-y to pay him out of the Trust and, in
effect, wrongfully "helped himself' to Trust asserts. The question is not whether Maynard,s fees should
have been paid; the qtiestion is whether Maynard wrongfully received payment of his fees out of Tmst
fi.mds disbursed by Nolen as Trustee. There is also no dispute that Nol'e11 iticutred the attol'ney fees
obligation While acting as Trustee of the Trust. Plaintiff alleges, essentially, that Nolen was acting in
self- interest and thus in a state of conflict if interest by resisting the heirs' attempts to obtain an
accounting of the time period while Nolen was Co-Trustee with Florence, resisting the heirs attempts to
remove her as Trustee, and resisting the heirs attempts to regain certait1 properties they -felt should have
been part of the Trust assets including misappropriation of Trust assets for her personal gain. Plaintiff
alleges that by resisting the.heirs' claims, Nolen was essentially wrongfully draining the Trust of assets
by paying legal fees that should have been paid by her individually, Plaintiff also alleges that Maynard
either advised Nolen that she should pay his fees out of Trust assets or failed to advise her that she
shouldn't pay his fees out of Trust assets.
At any rate, the legal foes incurred by Nolen for services performed by Maynard occtu·red during
two periods of time: from early 2006 until December 2006 (pre-litigation,) and from December 2006
until the lawsuit was resolved by settlement and/or when Nolen was removed as Trustee. (It's not clear
from the patties' memoranda what the specifics are regardi11g this.)
8
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In October 2009, the successor Trustee, Stagg Eldercare Services, and Nolen both represented by
counsel, settled their claims arising out of the December 2006 Iawsuit. Nolen was represented by
Maynat·d, who co.. signed the settlement agreement as attorney for Nolen. No judicial determination was
ever made regarding the final Trust accounting. Nor was there a judicial determination made, and
presumably none was requested, to determine what legal fees should be paid out of the Trust assets.
Rather, the parties setiled that matter themselves. .

In the settlement, the successor Trustee and Nolen specifically refer to the legal fees issue in the
Trustee>s waiver of any claims it may have against Nolen to repay those legal fees. The specific
language in the settleme11t is as follows:
4. The Trustee has also asserted a claim against Ms. Nolen to repay to the Trust certai11 legal fees.
that were paid by Ms. Nolen while she was the trustee.
5. To resolve all disputes and claims, Ms. Nolen agrees to pay to the Trust the a111om1t of
$150,000 ....
6, In exchange for the Payment, the Trustee will waive &11y and all claims that it has or has
asserted or may have against M$. Nolei1, The Trustee will also release Ms. Nolen from any and
all claims that is has asserted or alleged in its Third Amended Complaint filed in these
proceedings or that could have been alleged.
Plaintiff vigorously asserts that the resolution with Nolen did not release any other potential
wrongdoers, including Maynard and, therefore> she may still pursue a claim against Maynard for the
attorney fees she claims he wrongful1y received.
While Plaintiff may be justified in taking the position that she reserved the right to pursue parties
othe1· than Nolen, the Court concludes that she has waived their right to pursue a claim against Maynard
for reimbursement of attorney fees when the person responsible for any wrongful payment of those fees

released from liability for those claims. Pl'esmnably from the language of the settlement, Plaintitihas
already received°comp~nsation for that claim from the 'responsible party, that is Nolen. As far as unjust
9
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enrichment goes, it appears quite clear that if anyone was unjustly en1'iched it was Nolen. This is
especially true jf Plaintiff takes the position that Nolen did not reimburse her for those legal fees in the
settle1nent. If she did not, and Plaintiff is correct that she should not have used Trust funds to pay those
fees, then she has received free legal services. That would be. 1µ1just enri.chm_ent h1deed.
Plaintiffhas focused their attention on the wrong pal'ty by suing Maynard for the fees that he was
paid while perform:ing legal services for Nolen. It is truly unfortunate that the parties did not avail
themselves o.fthe help of the Cotn't in getting a l'esolutio11 as to the fees at issue. Instead, they chose to
proceed on their own in settlement and, as a result, Plaintiff is now foreclosed from pursuing what may
be seen as double recovery from the non-culpable party.
Additional_ly, if_Maynard is determined to be a co-obligor on the attorney fe~s isst1e, when
Plaintiff released Nolen, Maynard as a co-obligor was also released. The applicable law is set forth in
Utah Code Ann. § 15-4-5.
Summary judgment i-s granted in Favor of Defendants on Plaintifrs Third and Foru'th Claims.

The Aiding and Abetting Claim (Plaintiffs Fifth Claim1):

Plaintiff claims that Nolen breached her fiduciary duties to the Trust in a multitude of ways.
Essentially, Plaintiff claims that Nolen misappropriated assets from the Trust and then attempted to
cover up what she had done, It is undisputed that all of those alleged misappropriations occuned dming
the time Nolen was Co-Trustee, which was years before Maynal'd ever became ilwolved with her. The

1

Which is teally Claim Six, seqt1entinlly.
10
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forcing the beneficiaries to pursue litigation in order to obtain an accounting from Nolen, as well as
having her-removed. The continued complaint by the beneficiaries is that Maynard advised Nolen not to
provide an accounting of the time period during which she was Co-Trustee and advised her not to resign.
There is no l'easonable evidence that Maynai·d even lmew about the alleged misapproptiations by
Nolen until after the Decernber 2006 litigation was over. Plaintiff l'elies 011ly on one statement Maynard
allegedly made to Kent Cattani, that he would be surprised to learn that a lot of money had passed
through the Tmst account. Maynard also identified a few ~xamples of gifts to various individuals. In
doing so, Kent Cattani has stated that Maynard had a stack of documents on his desk that he was
referring to, There is no identification of what doctm1ents Maynard reviewed or was even refenfog to in
connection with these statements. There is also simply no evidence that Maynard reviewed documents
which would have shown the alleged misappropriations by Nolen. The inference from one statement
Maynard alleged made about moJ1ey passing through the Trnst-does not reasonably justify the inference
that he knew all about Nolen' s ha11dling of Trust money through the years as a Co-Trustee. Moreover, it
would have been very easy for Plaintiff to have discovered what specific documents Maynard reviewed
and what he lmew, but they did not do that. For the Court to make a giant leap from this statement that
Maynard even lmew about all ofNolen's transactions as Co-Trustee would be absurd.
At any rate, the law applicable to attorneys is that in m·der for them to be potentially liable for
aiding and abetting they must have acted otitside the scope of their representation and in their selfinterest. (See cases cited by Defendants). Essentially, there must be active participation in the breach of
fiduciary duty above and beyond simply giving legal advice. Simply giving legal advice, even in the
face· of knowledge of the· breach of the .:fidiiciaiy duty, is also i1o't enough: The· exp·ectatioh of"aii attomey
that he will be paid for his legal services is also not enollgh,

11
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As it has been framed the aiding and abetting claim is not actionable in this case and sununary

j udgrnent is granted.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based.upon the fo1·egoing, Maynard's Motion for Summat-y Judgment is granted in its entirety
and it is so ORDERED. The Court obviously has not addressed each and ev~ry poi11t raised fn the
Motion that may justify summary judgment ·but has rnled.sufficiently on each claim to grant summary
judgment as a whole,

. 14411\
day of Jt111e, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY
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I hereby certify that 011 this

/.Q.:;.

day of

..,J~. 2015. I did email., mail or hand

deliver a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision irnd Order to the foflowing:

EMAIL: JASON S CRANDALL jason@sumsioncrandall.com
EMAIL: MATTHEW L LALLI mlalli@swlaw.com
EMAIL: ALEX B LEEMAN aleeman@vancott.com
EMAIL: JOHN A SNOW jsnow@vancott.com
EMAIL: JEREMY J STEWART jjstewart@swlaw.com
EMAIL: GRANT M SUMSION grant@sunJsioncrandall.com
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DSCLll..DlL!l'IOl: OF THUST

TRIS DBCLTJlk~IO~ OF TROST, execute& by Ell.!.~EST OATEg,
h~:r.eir1after a.esi~natea ns "Trustee."

WITNESSETiJ:
That ERNES~ OATES Ann FLORENCE M1\.MB OATns, ~usbanc
ai1.d wiie, hereinafter referreC:. to as "Trustors, 11 have oonvoyec., trane:.ferreei. aca aasigne.d to the Ti-ustee by approJ;•riata instrurr.ents all

tnat certain prorierty ciescJ:i'bau in :E:::tid.bit "A11 attachei'.t hereto ana
l!lacle a part hereof, which !JrOj?erty, toftetber with

·which .nay bereait~r

oe

a:,~

other proi;'e1.-ty

transfe:rreG to tha .T.r\lstae to be he.le. unc.er

this Trust is oesignataa in. the Declaration of 'l"rust as the "T1..:.st

:estate;. n
All of the property trE..nsfar.red an..:. to be trc:.nsferre~
to ti.1is Tr.ist constitutes coTal.lunity p:ro::;,erty

oz

the 'h:Ustors an-5.

is to :retain its cn.a:recter as _such as part o:f tr,e Trust .Estnte:..
t;;. th~ eve.ut

cc.

SUO!l

properly is :cs tu:r1.1 ec'i to i:11-e Trustors, it shall

:i:etuz:i,e:cs as cc.mmur.i i:y pro;:1e.rt7.
I

RIGET5 RBSERV3P:~y TROSTOPE
Th.a Truetcre; s9ecifioally rasarve the. ::o.ll.o,-·ing r1g:;.ts
BI,c.. p=ivileg~s;

a.

t-uri.nq· th.air join·t life:tirilas to _alter·, amanlir :revnl:e

er "Cenz.inate this ~rust; in whole or in. pari:.

Upon the !.lea:tn cf

ei thc;:r of the T..;ustors, i:!OWever, tnis Ttt.s::. nhall b-acom-a irrevo-

B.

Joiutly er sevarally, by 'Nill or intar vivos, to c\dc

bsurance: pol.icies anci/cr an1• either ~rope:rty to tbe 'l':rus·t Esta ta.

Suen prc~~~r upo:i. acce!?ta1:.ce. by the 1:rustee, shal.l. beoom-.:. subj.ect

to t:1.s conditior:.s. anc. &ir1:1ctic1la of this Declaration of Trust.

l.
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II
DISTRJ:ElJTION OF WCOlB JI..HD PR.D:lCIP.AL

'l'he 'l1ru1n:ea shall apply am:! c.istribute the net inc011te

ant prir:ci-:;al of tha Trust ~s'Cht~ as follows:
J...

Dur111g the joint lifetime.s of the Tr.ustors tlle

Trustee sball auo undistributea income to the p~incipal, unless
clirectso. by the Trustors to

co

otl1erwise, ir. wnicb case ,:.he

Trustee sha.11 distribute the inoome as directed.

n.

In tba caae of ,:physic.ial incapacity or mental incmo-

petency of either T.rustor, tha ~ru.stee shall apply eo much of the
income ~na/or princi~al cf: the Trust as ie n~cessary in the sole

nat~;:minaticn of the T:rustee L~ orQer to msintaln

an.a

sUI3?crt saic

Truster in acccn:d·anoe with :iis er her standard of living,
C,

Upon the death of either Truster, the 'l':rustea s!:lal.l

diviae the '.Crust Estate into two separate funds uhich are hereir,-

after calle5 Trust "A" anG T.ruat "DM, each, of which shares shali
oonsti tuta ana be heJ.a, aaministered. and c:'!istributed in such a
manner

c!.S

\?'ill secure the ma:dmurn marital deG.uction anci/or cOlilmWlity

property ~clusioo unaer the Federal Estate Tax Laws in forca

at the aeath of the first to die of tl1e Trus~ors.
l.

Trust

".A"

shall be ~at part of tl1e Trust :E.state

consisting of (a) the survivin~ Trusto~•s separate property, plus
(b) t·he sw:viving Trustor 1 s shai;e of 1:he community property of the

·husband.and wiff:!, p·lus· {c) so -roach of the deceased Trustor 1 s separate
property a:s wher! ac:.aec! to the valu~ of all other prope.rty whi.ch

shal.1. hava passed. to. the sUI;V;lvi:r..g Truster,. either pursuant to or
outside of tl1e daceasea. Trustor 1 s Last Will and •restament or ar.y

coeiicil thereto, whether at the deceased irrus.tor' s death or prior

(t\l

thereto, with .respect to "1bicb a marital. deduction is allowable to
his or h<:..r estate, will e(!Ual in bhe nggregate one-half of tba
iteoease<i :.'£rustor 1 s adjusteci g:ross estate as defined in Section
2056

(c) (2)

of the, Internal Revenue Cooe of 1954, as it 10ay

pe

an1ended.

···------·-··..---~---~JP 00002
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2.

Ih allocating property tc Trust

11

.A", the i:r:rustee

shall. Use ,ralues as finally determinec or acceL:>ted for purposes of

the Federal Estate Troe return filed in behalf of tbe Trustor' s
estate, e>r.cept that if there has been either an appreciation or

a o.el?reciat;i.on in the value of all property available :for distribut:l.on to Trust "A 11 between. the valuation date used for Fec.eral
llistate :r·ax pu~oses and the date or 6.ates of such distribution

or ailocation, then such distril,ution or. al.location of propar.ty
to Trust "A" shall reflect a fair proportion of saia. appreciation

or depreciation, or i£ no such re~urn be required to be iil.sn,
the Trustee sha11. use values deemed by

ltiJn

tQ represent

fair ma:dtet

·values ana' his ·determination thereof shal.l be concl.usive,
3.

The 'l'rustee shal.l all.ocate to ~rust "A" no separate

property o:E the decedent TruGtor whioh. car.not!. gualif~r for the mari-

tal c.~cuction an.:!, ruccept to the extent that there shal.l be insuf-

ficient other assets, shall allocate thereto no separate property
of the o.eoed.ent Truster (a) which will. be subject to any foreiglz

estate, inherii:ar1ce, transfer, succes~ion or death tax or ciuty, or
(b) which wi11 be subject to income ta.Y. upon receipt by the T:r:ustee

o~ a.b~effaciar-1 hereof and wnich also will be subject to Feder~l
Estate Tax io the Truster's estate.

4.

EB

~..11 of the remaining Trust Estate shall. be set

aside as a sepa~ate Trust to be Qesignateo the Trust Estate oi

'rrust "B".
S.

The Trustee shall. pay tc or aJ?ply for the benefit

of the surviving Truster, duri,:;g his or her ·l.i'iet.:ime, in monthl.y
or other convenient installments, al.l of the ~et income from Trust

"A" together: with such amounts of princiyal of ':Crust "A 11 as may be
•re.guested by the surviving xx:ustor :from t:.ime to time.

Truster sl:..all at all times have

&.

The surviving·

genex:al power of appointment oven:

!rrust

t.

The Tru.s~e shal.l _pay to or apply fol: the be.ne.fit

~
3.
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of tne e;urvivi11g Trustor, du:rit1g his or her lifetime, niontl:ly or

oi:he.rwise in convenient installments, all of tht! net incoma from
~rust

11

0".

Ii at an:,t" tir.ia dux-ing the lifet.i.rae of the surviving

Trustor he or she shall be in need of aciciitional fu1;ds to support

ana maintain himself or herself in accoraance with his or her
stahllard o.f 1ivin9 as of the: date of death of tne a.eoedellt Truster,

the· :rrustee shall pay to or apply for l:he benefit of the survivir19

~-.rustor so much of ehe principal c¼: Trust wB" as ia neoessar"l' to
meet such stanuard and satisfy said need.

The TL-Ustee is directec

to re~ra the e:x:haus~ion of any other source of principal or income

available t~ the surviving T.rustor prior to the invasion of principal of Trust "B", however, in o:rder to enable the surviving Truster
to live in accorliar1ce with his er her standnrC: of living, inoluc.il1<]

the Trust Estate of Trust "A".
7..

The surviving Truster shall possess during 1:-.i.s

or her lifetime the libsolute righ-c, at his or her so1.e J.iscretion,
to invacie the priDCipal of Trust "2 11 in any amount up to $5, ooo. 00

o~ five per cent (S~} of the trust corpus of T:c,.1.st "B~ as i::h.en
constitute6, whichever is greater, per year.

Such right shall n.ot

be cmnulai,J.ve from yea:r to year so that failure to exercise this
power ot appoinbnent in any one year will not increase the amount
w~ioh may _be withdrawn in any ensuing year,
B.

f~cia:ry ~ereunae:r::,

:lUly ~rustee -who is not a T.rustor, .nor a .bene~~r

a blood rclati~e of a .Truster, may from

"ti.l.la to. tillle appoint to -:tbe su.:i::viving Trustor so much of the prin-

. cipal o~ T:r::ust wB.H up to the \\-.hole the.reef, as aaid .independant
~•rustee, in his sol a discretion r may cie.tel.""ZD.ine.

D.

On the death of the surviving Truster the Trustee.

shall distribute the principal. and any acotn!lulated income of Trust.
"A . . as tla•. surviving !rrustor shall appoint by Nill.

In the event

the surv.iving ~rustor shai1 fa~l to appoint s~ch assets, the smne

shai1 pour over into and become part of.Trust "D" as if originall~
_part thereof.

OJP. 00004
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On the death of t11e surviving Truster the remaining

bal'ance of Trust "B" (incluaing any portion of Trust "A" not

other,qise disposea of hereuniier) shall be distributea. t.o tbe chila:r:en

oi the Trustors in equal shares.

If any of said chilaren shall not

th1;-n be living, then the share of _such predeceased chilci shall ba
distributed to the surviving issue of ths same by right of repra-

sentation.

If tbere be no surviving issue, said shall be aade~

equally to the shares created for the other children of the Trustors
hereunae.r.

Said distributions shall be. subject to tha following,
1.

:Cf F_LOBENC:E MARSH (mother of the. wi~e TrUstor)

shall then be living, then no distribution shall be maae of the

€kt

home at which she· resides tmtil a.fte.r her passihg.

It is intended

that she shall continue to reside at said home without the payment

Qf rent until the oate of her dent.h.
2.

No aistribution hereunder shall he mad~ to any

bene:ficiar,i unaer the ag-e of 21 years.

The share o.f sucl, benefi-

ciary shall he retained in trust until he/she attains the age of
21, at which time cisl:ribution shall be mac:e,

In the meantirJe,

ho..1ever, s.ain bene£icia.ry sh.all bs maintained, educated anci supported

:i.r, accord wi tb his/her stancarci o! living.
II:I
POTwJP.S OF TRUSTJm

The TruEte.a shall ha:ve tlie p0we:r ,-1i th reapeot 'f!o the

proper·ty of· th6 T.rulft Bsta:te, or any part thereof, and upon such
te:i:ms and in such manner as he may ciee1n aavisable, to sell, convey,
eJmhan<;:r&, convert, ir:iprove, r.epair, manage, operate _and cont:col;

tc lease for terms within or beyond· the teons of this Trust antt
to encumbei: or hypothecate: the · '.!!rust p~operty alld to compromise
or otherw-1;se e.c'.ljust. any clam against or in favor of the Trust;

to

invest or ~einvest the t_..-ust funds in such progerty as the Trustee
1nny cieen

advisable, whether or not

c;if the character pe:nnittea by

J 'l.°l'r :for tl1e investment of trust funa.s; and the Trustee shall have

DJP 00005
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such aacli tionaj. ;;,owars as may not~ or herGafter be conf l:!rrsd upon

!•ir,l

by lai,., or ~.s may be neoe.ssar:; to en.able t.be Trustee to ::i.c.min.i-

ster this Trust in accordance with the provisions of this Trus-r.
l\g:=eeroe1·,t, subj act to &r,t limit~tion the.reof that rne:r be. p:rovi~aci

:for i1er1:i.r,.

'l'be Tl:Ustea is authorize~ to cOI;U!lillgle assets of '1-4,y

Trust created hereunder with assets of -~Yother Trust crea'.tecl
hereunaer, or othenrise, by the Trustors and to hold undiviaea

sbares in assets as part of any Trust Estate.
The Trustee is authorized, although no obligation is

placed on him in this regard, to make loans to, or purchase assets
from, the estate of either of the Trustors, upon such tarms and
conditions as agreed up<;in by the Trustee and respective Executoi.·.

Ths Trustee is fur"t:her autllorize~, although not obligatect, to pay

the funeral. ex:pense.s, eJ..1]enses of administratior.., 1.ast illness

~pe.nses and feaeral estate a.nd state inheritance taxes

oz

the

estates of e:ither o:f the Trustors, i£ the Trustee bl his sole

di~cretion shall so cete:cmin~.

IV
IliSURAHCB
The ~rl.tstors :reserve the right, -by their own act alone,
auring =t:hei:r: joint lifetimes, t1ii:hciut the consent or approval

of the ~r\.\Stee, to sell, assign or hypotheeaue any po1~cies of
5.3laurance upon the life of either.of the TrUsto~s roaae payable

to the Trustee, to exercise .my option or P.rivilege granted

by

such p0licies, including, but w.i.tbout limitation of the generality
of the. fo_:r:egoing, tile right to chang-e tha beneficiary of such J?Olicies r

to borrow any sum, in accoraanoe w!th the provisions of such policies and to receive _all payments, niviaenas, surrender va1ues,
benefits a~ ~rivileges 0£ any r.ina· which'may accrue on account

or

such policies dur~g their lifetiroe.

Furthermore, tbe Trustee

ag~ees to ae1iver to the Trustors on their written request any

Qjp 00006
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of such polictes oeposi'ted with the !l'i:ustee hereunder.
The Ti.-ustee shall use his best efforts to collect tl1e

proceeds of any polio~es 0£ insurance upon the life of either
of the Truators mane payable to the Tr.ustee hereunder when any
of such policies shall, to the knowledge of the Ti.-ustee, have

rnatureq, but it shall 11ot

until indemnified..

pe.

requireo. to take any legal proceedil1gs

The Tr\1stee shall have no responsibi:l;-ity,

except as above specified, as to any of such policies or the premiums

the:reor,,
V

· SPENDTiiIUFT PROVISIOl{S

The interes~s of beneficiaries in pri~oipal or incom~
shall r.ot be subject to claims of their creditors or others nor
to legal process, ana may not be voluntarily or involuntarily
alienated or encUll!bered.

This paragraph, however, shall net

restrict the general power 0£ appoirrttnent conferred U?on tha
surviving Truster over Trust "A" as here:lt.above set forth.
VI

LIABXLI'l'Y OF TROS~en

p.io bona or other security shall be regui.t:ed of any Trustee

in any jurisdiction.

No ~rustee acting hereunder shal.l ba liab~e

o:r responsible for any ltlistak~s or error of judgment i.q t:he admbd-

st.ration of tlle. ~.t:ust Es'ta-te. resulting. in loss t.o the estate by
rea·son of investr.ie.nt or otherw:i:se, save on-l;y .for wil.ftll nt:isconduct
or ;fraud.

l~o s\lccessor Trustee· shall in an:.y manner be l±.a.ble fo:r:

conduct, actions, or omissions oi any predecessor Trustee.

Any

succe~sor Trustee hereunder shall be liabl6 anu re~ponsible onl~
for such assets as are actually delivere~ .to him, without obliga-

tion to make accowiting for all asse.ts originally in the hands o:f
a preaeneusor Trustee.

vxr
11.CCOUNTil:lG AND SEXTLBMRNT

The Trustee shall not at a:n.y !=iJne be required-to make

7.
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any accounting of the ada~inist~ation of the TL7lst Estate to any
court er public authority whatsoever.

J\.ccounti119 shall be made

only to thG olciesi: anul.t beneficiary of nny t1.7lst he.reunaer at
such time. as saici benefioiar11 sball ciemand.

however, other than

21

Any Tnistee hereun6.er,

Trustee who is al.son Truster or a blood

relative of a Truster, shall make yearly accountings of the trust

~

es~ate to the bene:rioi.arie:s.
v:rII

Open the aeath, ~esignation or incapacity of Bm:rasT
OATES as

'I·ru.stee hereunder, FLO!tENCE MARSH OA'rES shall act as

· successor Trustee with the power to ·appoint a co-trust~e at
any t:iluf.l and a s-ucc~ssor trustee by any instrument in 't'IX'iting
which makes refer.enoe to this Trust.

In the event that ELOllEHCE

l-lAP..SH OATES is unable or unwil.ling to so se,:v.e, or ?,.!JO)l said persons
death, assund.Dg .that no· successor trustee has hse11 ar>pointec.

tnen EBUEST D. OATES shal.l act as successor Trustee.

FAILURE O:F BElIBFICl:.AllIES

In the event on termination of any trust create.a. herew1de1:

tnere sha~ be no el.igible beneficiary to receive the Trust Estate,
the ~ssets thereof sbal.l be distributed one-hal.f (~/2) each to
the heirs at law of each of the Trustars, as detel;TI\inad ~y tbe

J.aws of the-State of caJ.ifernia tben in force ana effect.

GENEML PROVISIONS
-In interp:ce.i:.ing this Decl.i\rat:ion of 'rrust:.

A.

The masculine shal.1 include the feminine ana vice-

B.

~dopted o~iluren shal.1 he treated fo~ al1 purposes as

if naturn1. morn.

·c.

The law of the Statµ of California shall he made

applicabl.e whel:'ever and whenever reference ta the law of the Scates

DJP 00008
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~

or any State is necessary.

IN WITHESS iffiBREOF, the Trustee. .has hereunto set his

hand this __~....
~t=b,___ day of. _ _""'.A=u....o-.._u_,s"'"'t"-'-_ _ _ _ _ _ _

l!) .1J,

.P.l?PROVED:

F ore ce Mar

tes

!!!RUSTOnB

S~TE OF cALIFORNIJ\.

)

cotmTY OF LOS 1U-TGBLES

)

On

( ss.

_ _ _A_.u......._g_.!J.B_t_4_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,

l9U:_. before me, the under-

signea,. a 't~otary Public in a:od for said. County and State, personally
appeared ERl-lEST OATES -nnd FLOREt?CE MAP.SH OATES, to lll!a! known
to be the persons wbose names are subscribed to the within instrument,

anu ea.oh acknowieaged to me that ·they executed the. sB1Jie.

¼~cc~

Np-i:jrl:y Publ,.ic in and for/Aaideouhty
and State

9.
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. . . .,..J

SCHEDUIE OF ASSETS

~

DATES FAb1,LY '£RUST

l.

Real property at 116 HeGt Avenue 26, LoB Ange:le.s,

Cali:fo:rrda, described as lot J of Tract 10397 as p~r map recorded
io Book 169, pages 18 and 19 of l·:laps, in the office of the County

R!:!corder of

2,

Los

Angeles.Couat::y.

Real property at 2521 Pasadena Avenue, Los Angeles,

Cali£orni.a, desc~ibed as those portions of Lots land 3 of Tract
No. 1039i as per map recorded i.n Book :1..69 pages 18 and 19 of 'Maps,

i~ the office of the county Lecorder of Los Angeles County, lying
easteriy of tbe northerly p~olongation of the westerly line: of
Lot 2. of sai.d tract,
3.

Real property a.t 4952 Lincoln .Avenue, los .Angeles,

Calitornia., described as Lot 14 in Bleak

11F 1r

of the Righlaod Park

Electric Tract, io the City of Los Angeles, as pe-r !D!ip recorded in
Book 9,. Page 162 of 1-iaps, in the office of the county -re co1:der of
Loa Angeles Coun-cy.

4.

'.Che Lig~ts of the Trustors under a promissory note

dated June 30, 1970 in the original amount of $57,490.37 executed
by

nRE SALES, a Cali£ornia Co:i;pora.l:ion.

5.

Rights of the Trustors uncle~ a promissory note d~ted

October$, 1970 in the original n100unt of $19,000.00 executed by
0

.Fi::lipe "Pech and. Socorro Pech, .secured by Deed of Trust on t;he real
property descLibed the~ein.

6.

Righta of the Truscorc under a Uniform Real Estac~

Concract: 6.xecutcd July l, 1970 bet:·ween Sandra Lynne SandbeLg as
Beller aod Ernesc Oates as buyer for the pu~chaae of ~eal property

L
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described as Lot 1qo. 73 of Eloomington Couol:ry Club SubdivisionJ

aacordiag to t:he official plat filed in tbe ~ffic.e of the_ County
Recorder of vtashington County 1 ~ tace of Utah.

....
'l
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•
AMENDME-NT OF .J.)ECbAflAJII-ON ,OF TRUST

•

ERNEST OATES and FLORENCE HARSH OATES, as Trustors
of the OATES FAMILY TRUST, a Declaration of Trust enter~d into
on August IJ, 1971, hereby amend the same as follows:
Artie-le II, paragraph· C,

L

subparagraph -

•

thi>ough and including

thereof, is amend ed to read as f6llowo :

"C.

Upon the death or either Trustor; th e

Trustee :ihall divide the Trust Es.tate into two separate
funds which are hereinafter called Trust
Trust

'B,'

.11 1 and

1

•

each of which -shares shall consti:tute and

be held, administered and distr.ibuted as her-einafter
set ·forth .

Tnt,1st'. 'A' :ihall c6risist'of:
1.

An amount· eQual to the vahle of the

llt,tr.Vi•v.ing·.Tru.stor 1..s i.:nterest in the community profierty
of the Trustors, whether .or not subject to ·probate
9d1Di n is,trat-i ('ln ;.
2.

All of the surv·iving Trust:01" s

separate prope;wty;
3.

That frac-t'ionaL .shar.e of tlie Trust

·i;:13tate ·(excluding any proper,ty or-- interests in ,property
.no.t eligible to sat:isfy the marital: deduction ,for
f ederal .e.stat.e tax purposes) that whe'Il· a·d.ded· -to the
to~al value for federal ~s~ate bax purposes, ao- finally
de_t'er.mined, or' all other int.erests·. in -pt'oper.ty that pass

•

or have passed frpm the ..de.cea·sed· l'r,ustor ·t'o or jn truBt
for

the surviving Trustor,, an·d .ti.at· are ,i.nc,1udahle in the

d.e.-ceased Tr,uslior' s g.ross ·es ..t.at'ei•fo.r,, ·.federal est'ute tax
punpo:i.es and q·uali.·fy,-i,ng . .-f>or •th.e· nra'..r·it,rl. ,cteduct:J!on , -equals

De.IP 0'0012 -- ····- ..-·--"--- - -..----1-
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•

the lesser of the following two amounts:
The maximum marital deduction allow-

a.

able far federal estate tax purposes; and
rhe minimum amount which. if subtracted

b.

frpm ,the val.ue of the deceased '.l'rustor I s gross estate
as finally determined for federal estate t~x purposes
would result in no r.ederal .estate tax imposed on the
·dec-ea~ed. Truster 1 s es tat~ after taking j,nto a_ocount.

all, availab,le ore9i·ts and, de.duat.i.ons tak~ against the
federal es~a te ..:tax.,
It-·~ the

'.r~ll;3 tors

I

intent that assets .qualif'yin:is

for the f.e,deral •estate ~ax marit;.al dedu,ction shall be
tt:'ansfer'red to the marital d.educti c;m trust only to the
extent that such traasf.er wou.ld effect a .reduction in
the federal flS tate ta.x ~ther_w ise payable by, the de-

ceased Trqstor's esta.te.

I.f the sur\riving,Trustor dl,s-

claim.s any portion .of the fractio,n~l loteres t
deceased Truator assigntr,d to Trust

I

A,

1

or

~he

'then suoh

disclaimed ~ortlon shall b~ added tp Trust

1

B,

1

~n cann~etian v1th. the satisfaction of this
al~ocation
~At

1 .

or

th~.d~c~ased rrustor's property to Trust

the Trust~e shall ·l':lpsign, convey and designate

the i;q.sh, .secul":i.bies e,nd oth~r 'property, including

real estate and aqy other in~erest therein which shall
aonstltQbe said tr~st.

The ~nset~ to be allocated to

establ~sh said Tru,t shall ~e s~lected in such a

manner that· the cash a~d. other property allocated will
have an aggregate t~ir. market value rairly repres~n-

·.ta.J;Ive of su.ch•Truist's pro.porti.ooate share of the
appreci,1:1tion or .c:Jepreciatlon in the. value to the: date,

or da tea or allocation or all p.roperty then availabl.~

for.allocation.

Any property included in the deoeased
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.

Trust.or's esl:.ite at l~he date of death and al.located in
lei nd l~o sa 1 d Trust shall be valued for that purpose at'.

the value thereof as finally determined for federal
estate tax purposes, and any other property so allocal:ed

No

shall be valued for that purpose at its cost.

assets

or. proceeds or any .isset · shall ,'be llicirided' in the 7•j-,ust

~~- to Mi 'i ell a mar i l;~ 1 ded (l lit:t·b>t1 =is .. ~0 eI', i\ l:1-i:>-¼a·b li! u:.:. ..
I

H

Hilllt:itled. /.•) sa.i d 't\:u:st l.iHur
1c cannot b~ sa tist'ied in·

11 ~bal;e''\:~.

tl:ie•:.'~~tel'it. tha't.

the· mb.nner: h~reitlab9ve·
1

pro-

The Tru~tors rdguest (to the extent consistent

Vi~ed.

with the forego~ng ins~ractions): but 60 ~ot dire6t,' that

of

the residence
Trust

1

thij' Truster~ be allocated "to Trust 'A.

1

B 1 shall consist or any other·property

of the deceaeed Truster not a p~rt of Trast 'A' by virtue

.

\

of the immediately preceding pi-,b-v"isiona of

'this :Article·,

1 t is the intent of the'· Tru·stors to take' ad- .
vantage of the enlarged· tnar'i tal cledan ti oh inade ava.iJ.able
by the Eoonomic Recovery Tax Act or 1981.

~-

Upon the death of a Truster and prior to

the division of the Trust Estate into Trust
Trusb

1

8' as hereinabove provided for,

shal+ pay to or apply for the benefit

1

A 1 and

the Trustee

or

the surviving

Truator the entire net inco~e of the Trust Estate,
· 'to·ge ther" with· such additional amounts· of' ~he principal
or'1:the l'rnst Estate

·as

are nec·eaaary for the. care, sup-

pc>'rt: maintenance· and education of the surviving l'rustor I

bi

1

1

acoo·rdani·e · wi t'h his/her •accustemed manner of living.

Upo';; tJ:ie de'ath 'of ·a Truster, the

pay

Tr-ustee ehall

out of Trust ·1'8 1 't~ "tlie extent· in his solo discre-

tlbn not provided ~or by the proba~~ estate
Tru'stor,

or

the

the· f:o'll.owing o't>U_gat::f.ons antl liab'ilitit3s as

-3-

oJP.:-.00O1A

\.
I

001637
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

soon as rea~onably convenient after the death of a
Truster (not necessarily in the order stated):

a.

The expenses of last illness and funeral

of the deceased Trustor;
All administrative costs and expenses

b,

including attorney's fees, accountant's fees and other
fee~ necessary t~ the ln~titution of any legal proceed~
ing and the ~iling of any tax returns required in order
to determi~e the

~~ount of

federal estate a n d @

~z

inheri ta nee taxes,:

rustor shall die leaving an estate subject to probate of which an administrator or executor
shall be appointed, the. Trustee upon reasonable notice
shall pay to such executor or administrator the amount

~-;-~·eral. estate tax pr, ul!.a}i,)

inheritance tax

arising by rea~on of inclusion of the Trust Estate
or any portion thereat' in the ta-xa~le··-eatate or. as
taxable property of the deceased Trustor.

Notwith-

standing anything in this instrument to the contrary,
the Trustee shall not pay any death taxes including

interest or penaltiest last illness and funeral
expensest attorney's ree, administration expenses 1
deb ts or ·other obligations of a deceased -Trus tor or

his est~te from funds received from qualified retirement plans that are otherwise excludable from the
aeae~sed Truster's gro~s estate for federal estate tax
purposes under Sectiqn 2039 of the 'rnter.nal Revenue
Code or any s·uocessot- · .s.tatute· or .frorn proceeds' of: insuran~~- p~lioies on the deceased ~ruator's life.

How-

~ver, to the extent there are no other as3ets available for suoh. purposes, or to the .extent the trust

..... -·•

- ........ .
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includes insurance proceeds in excess of the amount
of any insurance exemption available unde~ the laws
of the State of ·JJtah,

the Trustee, in its dis-

cretion, may use insurance proceeds that are taxable
in the deceased Truster ' s estate for federal estate tax
purposes for such payments .~

2.

In all other respects the provisions

or

•

said Declara-

tion of Trust as previously executed a r e ratified a nd affirmed.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,' the Trustors and l'r,uste.es, respectively,

have set t4e1r •hands this

/o -cf.

•

day of

19132.

THUS.TORS

J\CCEP'lED:

TflUSTEE

•
-5-
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S'l'/l.'l'E OF -UTA:H'

'COUN'f'Y OF

.L!JM~~ )

On

8u:§u.S'T

1

1982, before ~e, the

undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally
appeared ERNEST OATES and FLORENCE MARSH OATES, to me known
to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within
instrument, and each acknowledged to me that they executed the
same.

WI'l'NESS roy hand and official aeal.

DJP O~0.f7- ·
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